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ABSTRACT 
Beyond Saints and Sinners examines the forces affecting the exercise of 
discretion in American immigration courts, and argues that in this present age 
of immigration anxiety, the same facts that place an individual in deportation 
proceedings may constitute the reasons a judge will, relying on discretion, 
deny them relief for which they are otherwise eligible. The article explores 
the polarized narratives told about "good" and "bad" immigrants, the 
exceptionally difficult task of adjudicating in overburdened immigration 
courts, and the ways in which these polarized narratives interact with 
psychological short-cuts, or heuristics, that affect judicial exercises of 
discretion. After engaging in this analysis, the article concludes that aware-
ness of the force of broader societal narratives in immigration court can equip 
lawyers with tools to understand what might drive ajudge's use of discretion, 
help them tell the most effective narrative possible for their clients, and be 
aware of the opportunities-and need-to broaden the narrative space 
outside the courtroom in ways that can positively shape the cases of their 
clients of tomorrow. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Presiding over today's detained master calendar docket is a fifty year old 
judge, a former Peace Corps volunteer who was a trial attorney for the 
then-Immigration and Naturalization Service for ten years, and who has been 
an immigration judge since 1999. Today, among the twenty-four scheduled 
matters, two individuals on her docket are represented by attorneys. The rest 
are unrepresented and will likely seek continuances to find attorneys. 
Glancing through the files of the two cases where lawyers are present, the 
judge learns that Peter, from Sudan, entered as a refugee and then got at least 
one conviction for assaulting a police officer; the government attorney will 
likely oppose his request for bond because of the danger he poses to the 
community. Whether he ultimately gets relief will depend entirely on the 
judge's discretion to waive the impact of his convictions. There is also 
Veronica, a domestic violence victim who entered without inspection years 
ago from El Salvador. The file shows she has a prior deportation order from 
her initial entry and some minor criminal convictions from the last three 
years. Her attorney has filed two pre-trial motions that the government 
attorney will likely support, given the underlying domestic violence issues: 
one to get Veronica released from detention, and the other to reopen her old 
case because Veronica qualifies for several forms of relief as a domestic 
violence survivor. Her ultimate relief will also depend on the judge's 
discretion. The judge closes her files and enters the court, and Peter and 
Veronica's cases unfold. I 
Judicial discretion plays a powerful role in immigration court, and it 
remains significant even as it has been limited statutorily in the last fifteen 
years? Both Peter and Veronica are statutorily eligible for the relief they are 
seeking, but they must be able to present their stories in a way that clears the 
final hurdle in gaining relief: the judge granting them the relief as a matter of 
discretion. The simplified versions of their stories come before the judge, as 
here, with few facts, but with important contextual markers that position 
Peter as a criminal and Veronica as an abuse survivor. Although their stories 
are more complicated than this initial recounting suggests, the power of the 
judge's simple initial perception of the two individuals sets Peter and 
Veronica on different paths, through different laws and different procedures. 
I. Peter's story is based on a real case, with many details changed to protect his identity. Veronica 
is a composite of several of the clients I worked with during my time as an attorney at Women 
Empowered Against Violence, a non-profit organization in Washington, D.C. that served domestic 
violence survivors. The judge is a purely fictional character I created, but she is based on some of the 
immigration judges I have appeared before in immigration courts. While this article criticizes the 
overburdened system in which judges must work, it should not be seen as critical of immigration 
judges overall, the clear majority of whom strive to mete out justice despite almost impossible 
conditions. 
2. See The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
104-208 § 240A, 110 Stat. 3009-546 [hereinafter IIRIRA); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132 § 440, 110 Stat. 1214 [hereinafter AEDPA). 
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Where someone starts can make all the difference to the ultimate result in that 
individual's case. 
Restoring discretion to our immigration judges is a crucial piece of 
rendering our immigration laws more just, but this article concludes that 
discretion alone, in America's most recent age of immigration anxiety, may 
do little to change the quality of decisions made for individuals seeking 
immigration relief. The very events that put someone in immigration proceed-
ings in the first place may constitute the same factors that will lead the judge 
to deny relief as a matter of discretion. This article identifies the nature of this 
problem, because awareness of the force of broader societal narratives in 
immigration court can equip lawyers with tools to understand what might 
drive a judge's use of discretion, help them tell the most effective narrative 
possible for their clients, and make them aware of the opportunities-and 
need-to broaden the narrative space outside the courtroom in ways that can 
positively shape the cases of their clients of tomorrow. 
Discretion is an elusive concept, and discretionary relief for immigrants is 
said to be "in all cases, a matter of grace.,,3 Scholars have noted the 
progressive and dramatic erosion of discretion in immigration law, but have 
paid relatively little attention to the exercise of discretion where it does still 
exist. Since the dramatic 1996 changes to U.S. immigration laws,4 several 
forms of immigration relief are statutorily unavailable to immigrants with 
certain kinds of convictions, a development that has rightly been seen as 
limiting judges' ability to balance positive and negative equities for many of 
the individuals appearing before them in removal proceedings.s Even since 
1996, however, most immigrants who are not statutorily ineligible for relief 
3. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 354 (1956); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 308 (2001) 
(relying on the same language of discretionary "matters of grace"). See generally Daniel Kanstroom, 
Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TuL. 
L. REV. 703, 717-18 (1997) ("The concept of discretion is an exceptionally difficult one for all but the 
most positivist theorists of the nature of law. In almost all of its varied incarnations it appears as an 
interstitial idea at best, a gap-filler between more easily defined concepts like rules, 'plain language,' 
or, for some, deductive and analytic reasoning. When attention does focus on discretion, it is 
generally only to highlight its lack of meaning.") (internal citations omitted). 
Discretion appears in many ways throughout immigration law and practice, and the importance of 
those forms of discretion has been the subject of impressive scholarship. See also Shoba Sivaprasad 
Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. LJ. 243 (2010) 
(analyzing the ability of DHS prosecutors to avail of discretion to shape the kinds of cases being 
brought to immigration court in the first place); Nancy Morawetz, Introduction, Symposium, 
Immigration and Criminal Law, 4 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 3 (2001). 
4. IIRIRA, supra note 2; AEDPA, supra note 2. 
5. See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the 
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1954 (2000) ("Although these bills 
would alleviate some of the hardships imposed by the 1996 laws, they err in assuming that the 
government should take a step as serious as deportation based solely on the label of the crime or the 
sentence imposed.") (critiquing reforms that keep some version of mandatory deportation for certain 
crimes because almost no categorization of offenses exists that could avoid the absurd results created 
by the category-heavy 1996 laws). 
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must still establish that they deserve relief as a matter of discretion,6 so the 
concept remains powerful, if elusive, and worthy of attention. This is 
particularly true as reformers seek ways to peel back the 1996 reforms and 
broaden the role of discretion jn immigration relief. 7 
Discretionary "matters of grace" depend heavily upon the power and 
resonance of the narratives that individual immigrants can convey to the 
fact-finder, narratives which are heard in a courtroom or adjudicator's office, 
but which are told-by strategic choice and by default-in the context of 
broader narratives found throughout society.8 As scholar Leti Volpp notes, 
"[c]ertain narratives persuade because of already existing scripts .... ,,9 With 
societal discourse bouncing between polarized depictions of "good immi-
grants" and "bad immigrants," there is little space to tell authentic narratives 
about the many real, complicated immigrants like Peter and Veronica, whose 
stories inhabit the vast middle spaces between the good and bad "boxes" at 
either extreme. The importance of authenticity, upon which an individual's 
dignity depends, is in tension with the need to tell "winning" narratives. 10 A 
favorable exercise of discretion is inextricably bound with how closely the 
adjudicator can associate a case with the "good immigrant" box (often 
associated with "victims"), and avoid the "bad immigrant" box (often 
associated with "perpetrators"). 
This article explores the complicated, multilayered ways in which these 
societal narratives about immigrants arise in immigration decisions and 
affect the exercise of discretion. After setting the stage with a brief examina-
tion in Section I of how the stories Americans tell about immigrants, 
historically and today, show up in our immigration laws, and then telling the 
6. See e.g., INA § 240A(a) ("The Attorney General may cancel removal ... ") (emphasis added); 
INA § 209(c) ("[TJhe Attorney General may waive ... ") (emphasis added). 
7. See Morawetz, supra note 5; see also Jill Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncover-
ing Contributors to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 566 (decrying the 
lack of positive discretion and the corresponding "harsh lack of proportionality" as factors crowding 
the dockets of immigration courts). 
8. Leti Volpp, The Excesses of Culture: On Asian American Citizenship and Identity, 17 ASIAN 
AM. L.1. 63, 79 (2010) (referring to the transformation of a family violence incident into a critique 
about Islam, specifically invoking scripts about "gender, culture, immigration and Islam"). 
9. Id. 
10. David Luban's work in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY stresses the connection between 
law and human dignity, emphasizing the vital importance of authentic narratives. In a colloquium on 
the book, Anthony Alfieri noted that "Luban focuses on the lawyer's fundamental role in enhancing 
and assaulting human dignity. He relates dignity to an individual's right to have 'a story of one's own' 
and to have one's story heard. To be heard through legal representation is to have one's 'subjectivity' 
acknowledged. At bottom, individual subjectivity lies at the core of Luban's concern for human 
dignity." Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting the lena Six, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1285, 1298-99 (2008). 
Leigh Goodmark also powerfully critiques the harms of such narratives when they are inauthentic. 
She writes, "When we edit the stories of battered women, we lie about who they are and how they 
perceive the world around them. When those stories are accepted by others as truth, women are forced 
to live that lie." Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She 
Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75,118 (2008) (citing Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law 
Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 
HASTINGS L.J. 861, 875 (1992». 
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stories of two fictionalized immigrant characters, Peter and Veronica, in 
Section II, the article explores in Section III how the legal frameworks 
available to immigrants in removal proceedings reinforce those stories. 
U sing Peter and Veronica to illustrate the complexity of the intersecting 
issues, the article examines the important ways in which laws, procedures, 
and the character of immigration courts themselves heighten the problem of 
simplistic narratives and powerfully affect the exercise of discretion. I I In 
immigration court, the laws and procedures and structures available to 
immigrants mirror and reinforce the same narratives being told about 
immigrants in society, bouncing between good and victim narratives, and bad 
and perpetrator narratives. 
Among the most significant influences identified here as driving discretion-
ary decisions are those derived from the field of social psychology. These 
insights apply to these questions of discretion in at least three ways. First, 
there is the well-understood process of relying on narratives in general to 
bring order to complex facts. 12 Second, cognitive dissonance literature 
emphasizes the significance of first impressions and previous experiences, 
which make it more difficult to reconcile facts that deviate from expected 
narratives, particularly when those deviations call our prior moral judgments 
into doubt. 13 This is true within a case, where a later fact may be dissonant 
with an initial impression, but it also poses a challenge across the hundreds of 
cases that judges may hear on a particular kind of claim. Third, research on a 
phenomenon known as the "availability heuristic" demonstrates the predic-
tive power we draw from easily imaginable stories. 14 Again, the contrasts 
between the stories of Peter and Veronica show how these phenomena 
profoundly affect the judge's view of immigrants seeking discretionary 
relief, and how difficult it can be to cballenge the judge's narrative frame-
work. 
The psychological, legal and structural barriers that are addressed in 
Section IV lead into a discussion in Section V of strategies to expand and 
alter the narrative space that is so problematic in immigration court. Changes 
inside and outside the courtroom can improve the ability of lawyers and 
II. By choosing to use narratives as the entry point for my analysis, I am explicitly embracing the 
legal scholarship on narratives advanced in recent years by scholars such as Ann Shalleck, Anthony 
Alfieri, Kathryn Abrams, Leigh Goodmark. Jane Stoever and many others. As Leigh Goodmark 
writes, "[nJarratives can bridge the gap between the abstractions of the law and the individual 
experiences of individuals and groups who are. or seem to be, different." Leigh Goodmark. Telling 
Stories. Saving Lives: The Battered Mothers' Testimony Project. Women's Narratives. and Court 
Reform. 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 709, 732 (2005). 
12. This idea has been amply studied in other areas of the law, the scholarship of which I simply 
import into the context of immigration law, to provide a basis for the other insights developed in the 
paper. See infra Part IV for a more complete discussion of narratives as a cognitive organizing device. 
13. The theory of cogniti ve dissonance builds from the work of psychologists Leon Festinger and 
Elliot Aronson, and will be discussed in Part IV(B), infra. 
14. Further explained in Part IV(c), infra, the availability heuristic was first studied by cognitive 
psychologist Amos Tversky and behavioral economist Daniel Kahneman. 
2012] BEYOND SAINTS AND SINNERS 213 
immigrants to tell more authentic stories, upholding the dignity of the 
individual immigrant and expanding the kinds of stories that can earn 
relief---effectively bringing an old story back into court, that of America as a 
land of new opportunities, a country where flaws do not consign us to failure. 
I. DISCRETION AND AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION MYTHOLOGY 
Judicial discretion, ultimately indeterminate, necessarily relies upon infor-
mation and intuitions which derive from the world beyond the courtroom. 15 
Belonging as it does "to the twilight zone between law and morals,,,16 
judicial discretion implicates malleable, ever-shifting notions of what consti-
tute positive and negative equities, which emerge from the world beyond the 
courtroom. In immigration court, those notions are bound up in the narratives 
we tell, societally, about which immigrants are worthy, and which are not. 
Here, we can see how both the law, which has an expressive function, and the 
media create similar narratives, limited to the binary options of "good 
immigrants" and "bad immigrants." 
A. The Expressive Function of Law in Creating Binary Immigrant 
Narratives 
Some of the "world beyond the courtroom" enters through other parts of 
government, including Congress itself, which have steadily put immigration 
courts on notice that their exercise of discretion is not found to accord with 
the nation's interest. The 1996 changes to immigration law removing or 
greatly reducing discretion from many forms of relief were one powerful 
moment of "notice." Before 1996, the "suspension of deportation" law 
permitted judges to weigh the hardships of deportation to the immigrant (and 
certain qualifying family members) even in the presence of criminal convic-
tions. 17 Legislators believed that the discretion inherent in this relief was 
pervasively over-used; the negative effects of discretion were on legislators' 
15. Discretion appears in many ways throughout immigration law and practice, and the 
importance of those forms of discretion has been the subject of impressive scholarship. Kanstroom, in 
an elegant taxonomy of the many forms that discretion takes in immigration law, differentiates 
between the discretion that infuses any judicial fact-finding endeavor and the "delegated discretion" 
that is the particular problem at issue in many immigration removal cases. Kanstroom, supra note 3, 
at 717, 751-766. Kanstroom sub-divides interpretive discretion into general interpretive discretion 
(the process of bringing meaning to terms of art in immigration law like "particularly serious crime" 
for Peter), procedural interpretive discretion (the power to set the context for the cases, like whether 
or not to reopen Veronica's prior deportation order), and factual interpretive discretion (the 
application of "elusive" legal concepts to facts, such as whether Veronica's criminal convictions are 
"substantially related" to the abuse she suffered). ld. at 751-59. Juliet Stumpf builds on Kanstroom's 
earlier work, decrying the binary nature of options that are therefore open to most immigrants in 
removal proceedings. See generally Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683 
(2009). 
16. Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual 
Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 929 (1960), quoted in Kanstroom, supra note 3, at 717 n.63. 
17. Eligibility for Suspension of Deportation, 8 C.F.R. § 240.65(c) (1997). 
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minds, as well as the perception that discretion was encouraging immigrants 
to come, knowing they would be given as many "second chances" as 
needed. 18 Congress duly replaced suspension of deportation with "cancella-
tion of removal," and the new relief statutorily precluded all of those with 
aggravated felony convictions,19 effectively eliminating an important area of 
discretion from the hands of immigration judges. This act of Congress is an 
excellent example of the "expressive function" of law vis-a-vis societal 
norms: in this instance, the beginning of conflation of immigration violations 
with criminality.20 
Another, much less heralded moment, which reinforced the expressive 
value of the 1996 laws occurred in 2002. In Matter of Jean, the Attorney 
General certified to himself a case concerning a refugee waiver that was 
initially denied by an immigration judge, who was subsequently reversed by 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The Attorney General was pro-
foundly troubled by a culture of unfettered discretion and the BIA's seem-
ingly casual, unjustified reversal of the immigration judge's decision?1 The 
decision signaled that the discretion delegated to judges by statute needed to 
be exercised in a far narrower manner.22 Here, the message from the 
executive branch aligned with the changes made by the legislature in 1996; 
the tenor of the legislative and executive changes and mandates provided 
immigration courts with a clear understanding that there had been a shift 
toward disfavoring immigrants with criminal histories, and toward insisting 
18. One representative made the link directly, stating "[w]hat's more, illegal immigrants make up 
more than 25 percent of the Federal prison population, and over 450,000 aliens are criminals on 
probation or parole. Breaking the law also undermines the incentive of all immigrants to enter the 
United States legally .... We must also send potential illegal aliens a clear warning: 'one strike, and 
you're out.' In other words, if you break the law, you forfeit the privilege that millions of Americans 
have struggled to achieve." 142 CONGo REC. H2538 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996) (statement by Rep. 
Hastings). See also Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process 
Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 157 n.270 (1998) (quoting Rep. Lamar Smith as saying "based on ... 
recent Board of Immigration Appeals decisions, there is legitimate concern that even a narrowly 
tailored form of relief would soon be broadened to include a wide range of cases never intended by 
Congress. "). 
19. Both of these terms are far broader than common understanding would suggest. Aggravated 
felonies are defined in INA § 101(a)(43), and include a broad variety of crimes of varying degrees of 
seriousness. Convictions, too, include admissions of facts sufficient to "warrant a finding of guilt." 
INA § lDl(a)(48), and exist for immigration purposes even where they have been expunged in the 
criminal setting. See Matter of Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512, 514-19 (BIA 1999). 
20. For a full exploration of this notion of the law's expressive value, see Cass R. Sunstein, On 
the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV: 2021,2051 (1996) ("There can be no doubt that 
law, like action in general, has an expressive function .... Many debates over the appropriate content 
of law are really debates over the statement that law makes, independent of its (direct) consequences. 
I have suggested that the expressive function of law has a great deal to do with the effects of law on 
prevailing social norms. Often law's 'statement' is designed to move norms in fresh directions."). 
21. The Attorney General first criticized the BIA's failure to delve fully into all the factors present 
in this case: "[A]s deeply troubling as the ruling in [Matter of H-N-] is, the Board's decision in this 
case is even more difficult to accept ... The Board's analysis ... is grossly deficient." Matter of 
Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. 373, 382-83 (A.G. 2002). 
22. [d. at 383 ("In my judgment, that balance [offamily hardships and the nature of the criminal 
offense] will nearly always require the denial of a request for discretionary relief from removal, 
where an alien's criminal conduct is as serious as that of the respondent."). 
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upon accountability when discretion is exercised favorably. 
On the other hand, discretion has persisted and been broadly applied for 
discrete subsets of immigrants. For immigrants who have experienced 
domestic violence, human trafficking, or other serious crimes, Congress has 
steadily enacted additional waivers and exceptions to create a more inclusive 
zone of eligibility for immigration relief?3 The executive branch assigned 
adjudication of these matters almost entirely to a specialized unit, now 
known as the Crime Victims Unit.24 The Attorney General has simultane-
ously reinforced the uniqueness of these immigrants by certifying cases 
where, in contrast to Jean, the Attorney General wants immigration judges to 
show more inclusiveness toward victims.zs An overall message thus emerges 
of congressional and executive support for "victims,,,26 where judges may be 
23. In the sphere of admissibility, numerous waivers and exceptions exist. See INA § 212(a)(6)(ii) 
(creating an exception to the "present without admission or parole" ground of inadmissibility); INA 
§§ 212(a)(9)(B)(iii)(IV-V) (exception to the unlawful presence bars for "battered women and 
children" and victims of severe forms of human trafficking); INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(iii) (creating a 
waiver for VAWA self-petitioners whose unlawful re-entry was connected to abuse); INA § 212(d)(13) 
(broad waiver of almost all inadmissibility grounds for trafficking survivors); INA § 212(d)(J4) 
(broad waiver of almost all grounds of inadmissibility for those crime victims seeking U visas); INA 
§ 2 12(g)(1)(C) (waiver of some criminal grounds of inadmissibility for VAWA self-petitioners). In 
removal, other waivers apply. INA § 237(a)(1)(H) (waiver of fraud and misrepresentation for VAWA 
petitioners); INA § 237(a)(7) (waiver for domestic violence convictions where there was a connection 
being battered or subjected to extreme cruelty). In relief from removal, the VAWA special-rule 
cancellation provides more favorable terms for seeking relief. INA § 240A(b)(2) (permitting 
cancellation where extreme hardship to self is established). In voluntary departure, restrictions on 
availability of voluntary departure do not apply to VAWA self-petitioners. INA § 240B(2). Finally, 
VAWA self-petitioners receive more favorable access to adjustment of status. INA § 245(a) 
(permitting adjustment for VAWA petitioners even when they entered without inspection); INA 
§ 245(c) (excluding VAWA petitioners from the restrictions enumerated in this sub-section). 
24. The unit charged with overseeing discretionary relief for T and U visas and VAWA 
self-petitions is the Crime Victims Unit (formerly the VAWA Unit) at USCIS's Vermont Service 
Center, a specialized unit whose staff receives training in the dynamics of domestic violence and 
trauma, and which experiences a low rate of staff turnover. In its 2010 report to Congress, DHS noted 
that "[t)he ultimate goal in providing relief to battered immigrants is to reduce family violence while 
offering protection to victims. The best way to achieve this goal is to maintain a permanent VAWA 
Unit and permanent staff who have sufficient expertise and understanding of domestic violence and 
the impact that a poor decision can have on a battered immigrant. The Unit staff are extremely 
attentive to the well-being and safety of battered immigrants who file VAWA self-petitions." 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
ACT UNIT AT THE USCIS VERMONT SERVICE CENTER 3 (2010), available at http://www.uscis.govIUSCIS/ 
Resources/Resources%20for%20Congress/Congressional%20Reports/vawa-vermont-service-center. 
pdf [hereinafter USCIS REPORT). 
25. See Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (A.G. 2008) (remanding a case to make asylum more 
available to victims of female genital cutting); Matter of R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008) 
(lifting a previously ordered stay so that the respondent's domestic violence-based asylum case could 
be reconsidered). 
26. The use of the word "victim" is problematic, but pervasive (as reflected in the 20 II renaming 
of the Vermont Service Center's VAWA Unit to the "Crime Victims Unit"). See USCIS OMBUDSMAN, 
ANN. REP. (2011),10 available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cisomb-annual-report-201 l.pdf 
(noting the renaming of the VAWA Unit to the Crime Victim's Unit). The legislation providing relief 
relies almost entirely on victim terminology. See INA §§ 101(a)(I5)(T), (U). Although VAWA 
self-petitioners refer to people who have been "battered or suffered extreme cruelty," VAWA 
self-petitions are viewed as part of crime victim relief generally. See, e.g., Immigration Options for 
Victims of Crimes USCIS, http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Humanitarian/Battered%20Spouse,% 
20Children%20&%20Parents/lmmigration%200ptions%20for%2OVictims%200f%20Crimes.pdf (last 
visited May 30, 2011). Such a focus has been broadly and well critiqued elsewhere. See, e.g., 
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called upon to implement pro-victim policies through individual favorable 
exercises of discretion. 
B. The Role of the Media in Crafting Binary Immigrant Narratives 
Beyond outright directives and more subtle trends emanating from the 
legislative and executive branches, there are stories in the media depicting 
policy debates, major events, and individual stories alike.27 As discussed in 
Section IV, infra, such stories affect judges who, at the end of a day, go home 
and read the newspapers, watch television, go to the movies, and otherwise 
participate in daily life in America in similar ways to the general pUblic?8 
The stories fit comfortably within two lines of immigrant narratives, which 
are found throughout American history. The first narrative depicts the 
hard-working immigrant who comes in search of the American Dream. This 
narrative gave us the "city on a hill" and Ellis Island imagery of an America 
whose dynamism relies on the initiative and passion of the immigrants who 
come here to contribute.29 Today, the quintessential immigrant in this first 
narrative is the DREAM Act student, whose narrative emphasizes blameless-
ness, love for the country, and dreams of great achievement. 30 The second 
Goodmark, supra note 10, at 118; Dina Francesca Haynes, Client-Centered Human Rights Advocacy, 
13 CLINICAL L. REV. 379 (2006); Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability 
Rights Litigation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 247 (2001); Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real 
Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157 (2007). 
27. See Toril Aalberg & Zan Strabac, Media Use and Misperceptions: Does TV Viewing Improve 
our Knowledge about Immigration? NORDICOM REV. 31 (I), at 35-52 (2010) (Nor.) (providing an 
assessment of the kind and quantity of information about immigration available through television), 
available at http://www.nordicom.gu.se/common/publ_pdf/321_aalberg_strabac.pdf. 
28. The power of the media, with both its intentional and unintentional aspects, is explored 
thoroughly in the landmark work, ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 57-64 (7th ed. 1995) 
[hereinafter ARONSON]. 
29. The National Park Service describes Ellis Island effusively with the following description: 
"They came seeking freedom, opportunity, new lives. Over 12 million immigrants passed through ihe 
doors of Ellis Island between January I, 1892 and November 1954, hoping to achieve the' American 
Dream.' These people, and their descendants, have woven their way into the fabric of American life. 
They have helped create the America we know today." Ellis Island, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, 
http://www.nps.gov/elis/index.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2011); see also Leti Volpp, Impossible 
Subjects: Illegal Aliens and Alien Citizens, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1595, 1595 n.1 (2005) (reviewing MAE 
NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2004)) (quoting 
National Park Service materials concerning the Statue of Liberty with depictions of America as 
"nation of immigrants" and a "melting pot."). 
I refer to this vision as "mythology" for even in the era which generated the enduring images of the 
Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island, an entire race of would-be immigrants was excluded from this 
vision, specifically immigrants from Asia who were blocked from entering America in almost any 
manner from the 1880s through 1952. See generally Kevin Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws and 
Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror" Into the Heart of Darkness, 73. IND. L. 1. 1111 (1998). 
30. A classic articulation of this view of the DREAM Act was made by Republican presidential 
candidate Mike Huckabee: "When a kid comes to his country, and he's four years old and he had no 
choice in it-his parents came illegally ... That kid is in our school from kindergarten through the 
12th grade. He graduates as valedictorian because he's a smart kid and he works his rear end offand 
he becomes the valedictorian of the school. The question is: Is he better off going to college and 
becoming a neurosurgeon or a banker or whatever he might become, and becoming a taxpayer, and in 
the process having to apply for and achieve citizenship, or should we make him pick tomatoes? I think 
it's better if he goes to college and becomes a citizen." White House, DREAM Act: Good for our 
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narrative focuses on the danger that the poor or troubled or criminal 
immigrant poses to America. Over time, variations of this have included the 
"dirty" Irish, the "backward" Chinese, the Germans and Italians who refused 
to assimilate to Anglo-American values and culture, the immigrants from 
Eastern Europe sowing their undemocratic political ideologies, and so forth. 
This narrative today shows up as the uneducated lawbreaking immigrant who 
takes jobs away from Americans,3! uses public services without paying 
taxes,32 crowds emergency rooms,33 and refuses to learn English.34 Most 
powerfully, this narrative equates immigrants with criminals, and it does not 
distinguish between those who commit the civil violation of being present in 
the U.S. without inspection and those who commit crimes once present.35 
Partly driving and partly driven by a well-documented conflation of America's 
Economy, Good for Our Security, Goodfor our Nation, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/DREAM-Act-WhiteHouse-FactSheet.pdf, (quoting an NPR Radio Interview with 
Mike Huckabee on Aug. 11,2011) (emphasis added) (last visited Dec. 26, 2011). 
31. PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, BEYOND RED v. BLUE: THE POLITICAL 
TYPOLOGY 5 (2011), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdflBeyond-Red-vs-Blue-
The-Political-Typology.pdf (finding in a survey that among the "hard-pressed" segment of Demo-
cratic voters, 76% believed immigrants were a burden because they took jobs and health care, a belief 
shared by 68% of "staunch conservatives" and 60% of "main street Republicans). 
32. See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold and Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Finds Serious Concern Among 
Americans About Immigration, N. Y TIMES, May 3, 20 I 0, at A IS, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010105104/us/04poll.html(noting that "three quarters [of those polled] said that, over all, illegal 
immigrants were a drain on the economy because they did not all pay taxes but used public services 
like hospitals and schools"); Teresa Watanabe, L.A. County Welfare to Children of Illegal Immigrants 
Grows, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2010, L.A. TIMES, at 3, available at http://articles.latimes.comI201O/sep/ 
05/local/la-me-illegal-welfare-20 I 00906. 
33. See, e.g., Richard Wolf, Rising Health Care Costs Put Focus on Illegal Immigrants, USA 
TODAY, Jan. 22, 2008, at lA, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washingtonI2008-01-21-
immigrant-healthcare_N.htm; L.A. Emergency Rooms Full of Illegal Immigrants, Fox NEWS (Mar. 
18, 2005), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0.2933.150750.00.html. But see Mary Engel, Latinos' Use 
of Health Services Studied, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27,2007, at B I, available at http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2007/nov/27/local/me-immigrants27 (quoting a UCLA professor who says that "In fact, [undocu-
mented immigrants] seem to be underutilizing the system, given their needs."). Other stories include 
those of immigrants coming across the border solely for the purpose of giving birth-the summer of 
20 I 0 fetishized the obscene term "anchor baby" to promote a story about "bad immigrants" abusing 
America's hospitality in this particular way. The most recent story is that of asylum seekers who lie or 
embellish to "game the system," following in the wake of the Dominique Strauss-Kahn scandal. See, 
e.g., Robert Siegel, Asylum Seeker Stretches the Truth for a Better Life, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Jul. 25, 
20 II), available at http://www.npr.orgI20 11/07/251138683238/an-asylum-seeker-stretches-the-truth-
for-a-better-life. 
34. Elizabeth Llorente, English-Only Bills Spark New Battle Over Language, Fox NEWS LATINO 
(Mar. 16, 20 II), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politicsI20 II 103116/new-battle-brewing-united-
states-needs-official-english-Iaw/. 
35. See J. David Cisneros, Contaminated Communities: The Metaphor of 'Immigrant as Pollut-
ant' in Media Representations of Immigration, II RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 569, 585 (2008) (noting that 
"[t]he concrete dangers of immigration are usually traced to heightened crime, economic burden, and 
the threat of terrorism. Many of the stories during the time period analyzed featured images of 
immigrants in crowded jails being detained and processed by police officers and border officials."); 
see also GUSTAVO LOPEZ, HUMANITY VS. ILLEGALITY: POST 9111 PRINT MEDIA DISCOURSE ON MEXICAN 
IMMIGRATION, McNair Summer Program Research Institute (2009), available at http://mcnair.usc.edu/ 
currentlresearch_projects/Gustavo%20Lopez%20Final%20Paper.pdf. 
Several scholars have also addressed the increasing conflation of immigration violations with 
criminality. See Jennifer M. Chac6n, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control 
and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007); Nora Demleitner, Misguided Prevention: The 
War on Terrorism as a War on Immigrant Offenders and immigration Violators, 40 CRIM. L. FORUM 
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criminal and immigration laws, mainstream politicians and fringe hate 
groups alike define the act of living day-to-day as an undocumented immi-
grant as an illegal enterprise. When an undocumented immigrant then also 
commits an actual crime, the undocumented status is portrayed not just as an 
aggravating factor, but as co-equal crime, making it difficult to distinguish 
between the criminal offense and the civil immigration violation. While 
Maricopa County, Arizona, was an official partner of the Department of 
Homeland Security's immigration enforcement efforts, its sheriff, Joe Ar-
paio, generated many images that visually represented this conftation, from 
posters against illegal immigration emphasizing handcuffs, or videos of 
police issuing pink underwear to Latino men in the Maricopa County jail 
which houses both criminals and those awaiting transfer to immigration 
custody. 36 
Two stories from the summer of 2010 capture vividly the polarization of 
these narratives, and also help to show how the narratives feed into discretion-
ary decisions. First, the Washington Post featured a front-page story about a 
so-called "DREAM Act" teenager named Yves Gomes, accompanied by a 
photo of Yves singing in his church choir, with the camera taking a heroic 
angle looking up at Yves to the stained glass windows above his head.37 Yves 
had stellar academic records, dreams of success in America, and no blem-
ishes on his record-but for the one fact of being brought to the U.S. as a 
child and remaining here without status, a blemish for which Yves himself 
bears no blame. After all this publicity, Yves won deferred action, offering 
him a chance to avoid deportation and to work lawfully in the country. 
Yves perfectly fits the good immigrant narrative that permits favorable 
exercises of discretion, and his relief foreshadowed the Administration's 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy extending deferred 
action to other immigrant youth who had come to the United States before the 
age of 16, who attended school, and who reasonably untroubled criminal 
histories (defined as no felony or significant misdemeanor conviction, or not 
550 (2004); Juliet P. Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 
AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006). 
36. For videos of both these images, see Chuck Conder, Arizona Sheriff Under Investigation for 
Alleged Abusae of Power, CNN, July 9, 2010, http://www.cnn.coml201O/CRIME/07/09/arizona. 
tough.sheriff/index.html?iref=allsearch; see also Elyse Siegel, Arizona Sheriff Joe to Illegallmmi-
grants: We Have Plenty of Room for You in Tent Jails, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2, 2010), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.coml2010108/02/arizona-sheriff-joe-arpai_n_667844.html; Alexis Vance, 
Sheriff Joe's Immigration Sweep, Fox NEWS LATINO (Nov. 15,2010), http://1atino.foxnews.comllatino/ 
newsI2010111/15/deputies-raid-el-mirage-Iandscaping-business-id-theft-probe/; CNN, Sheriff Joe Im-
migration Enforcement, YOUTUBE (May 23, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=088 
pHAcZnGU. 
37. David Montgomery, A Rare Reprieve from Immigration Limbo: Indian Teen Illegally in the 
U.S. is Allowed to Pursue College in the Only Home He's Ever Known, WASH. POST, Aug. 12,2010, at 
A I, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/contentlarticleI20 I 0/08111/ AR20 I 008 
II 06293.html?wprss=rss_print; see also WE ARE AMERICA, Yves Gomes: Maryland 17 Year Old to be 
Depo rted, http://www. weareamericastori es.orglvideos/yves-gomes-mary land-I 7 -year -old-set -to-be-
deported-on-august-131 (last visited Dec. 27, 2011) (a video depicting Gomes as a top student who 
assists with his uncle's significant health needs during his free time). 
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three or more misdemeanor convictions). 38 As of November 2012, more than 
50,000 immigrants below the age of 30 had benefited from such relief from 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.39 
For immigrants beyond the scope of DACA, efforts to elaborate standards 
for prosecutorial discretion have done little to extend relief beyond the 
archetypally "good immigrant" narratives of Yves Gomes and other immi-
grant youth. In 2010, John Morton, director of United States Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE), released a lengthy memorandum on ICE's 
directive to exercise prosecutorial discretion in thousands of pending immi-
gration removal cases; that discretion was to be exercised where individuals 
had strong pending applications and where those individuals had no "adverse 
factors.,,4o Specifically, "[a]dverse factors include, but are not limited to, 
criminal convictions, evidence of fraud or other criminal misconduct, and 
national security and public safety considerations.,,41 The more comprehen-
sive memo on prosecutorial discretion from 2011 theoretically permits even 
those immigrants with modest criminal records to benefit from prosecutorial 
discretion, but ICE experienced significant internal resistance to those newer 
guidelines,42 and only 7.16% of cases were closed through the Administra-
tion's engagement in prosecutorial discretion review.43 For detained individu-
als, many of whom are subject to mandatory detention because of the 
existence of criminal convictions (ranging from serious convictions to more 
trivial drug possession charges),44 the numbers receiving favorable exercises 
of discretion are extremely limited. As of May 2012, only 40 cases benefited 
38. USCIS, Deferred Action Process for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement Priorities 
(Sept. 14, 2012) http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb 1 d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543 
f6d 1 a/?vgnextoid = f2ef2fl94 70f731 OV gn VCM 1 00000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel = f2ef2f 
19470f731OVgnVCMI00000082ca60aRCRD. 
39. USCIS, Deferred Actions for Childhood Arrivals Process, http://www.uscis.gov/USCISI 
Resources/Reports% 20and %20S tudies/Immigration % 20Forms % 20Data/S tatic_filesl20 I 2-1116% 
20DACA %20Month1y%20Report.pdf. 
40. Memorandum from John Morton, ICE, Guidance Regarding the Handling of Removal 
Proceedings of Aliens with Pending or Approved Applications or Petitions (Aug. 20, 2010), http: 
IIgraphics8.nytimes.comlpackages/pdf/usI27immig_memo.pdf. 
41. Id. This guidance was updated in June 2011, and now states that the negative factors 
weighting against prosecutorial discretion include risks to national security, "serious felons, repeat 
offenders, or individuals with a lengthy criminal record of any kind; known gang members of other 
who pose a clear danger to public safety; and individuals with an egregious record of immigration 
violations ... " Memorandum from John Morton, ICE, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consis-
tent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention 
and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/ 
prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf. 
42. Julia Preston, Agents' Union Delays Training on New Policy on Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 8, 2012, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.cOml2012/01l08/US/ilIegal-immigrants-whO-
commit_crimes_focus_of_deportation.html?pageWanted=all%3Fsrc%3Dtp&smid=fb-share. 
43. National Immigration Forum, The Math of Immigration Detention: Runaway Costs for 
Immigration Detention Do Not Add Up to Sensible Policies (Aug. 2012) http://www.immigration 
forum.org/images/uploadslMathofimmigrationDetention.pdf. 
44. Crimes triggering mandatory detention are enumerated at INA § 236(c). For a critique of this 
provision, among others, see generally Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 
Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936,1941 (2000) 
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from prosecutorial discretion, from a total of 56,180 reviewed. This excep-
tionally low rate (0.7%) for detained immigrants reflects the difficulty of 
obtaining discretionary relief even under the more nuanced 2011 memo for 
those whose stories are less straightforward than the compelling story of an 
individual like Yves Gomes.45 
The archetypal counter narrative in 2010 arose when Carlos Martinelly-
Montano killed a nun in a drunk driving crash.46 Martinelly-Montano is a 
Bolivian man who was living in Prince William County, Virginia, and was 
already in immigration proceedings which had been delayed several times. 
The reaction was immediate and ferocious.47 Prince William County's Board 
of Supervisors Chairman Corey Smith said, "Blood is on the hands of 
Congress for not properly funding immigration enforcement,,48 The prosecu-
tor in the case, who sought to elevate involuntary manslaughter charges to 
homicide charges, added that, '" [T]his is the worst of the worst. ,,,49 That this 
happened in Prince William County, Virginia, only inflamed the fires of the 
narrative, because that County had steadily and adeptly been promoting the 
"bad immigrant" narrative at every possible juncture.50 Notably absent in the 
media furor was any information about Mr. Martinelly-Montano himself 
beyond his age (twenty-three) and lack of lawful immigration status. Why 
did he come to the U.S.? How long had he been here? Did he have family, 
here or in Bolivia? Was he employed and supporting them? How long had he 
been alcoholic? Had he ever sought help for the alcoholism? Such details 
would not convince the extreme anti-immigrant forces who eagerly seized 
this story as proof for their every position, but the media's consistent 
omission of any details that would complicate and, therefore, humanize Mr. 
Martinelly-Montano, reifies the "immigrant as criminal" narrative and makes 
it far easier to perceive that the only correct course of action in his case is 
45. The ways in which immigration politics have forced immigrant youth to put forward such 
binary narratives is the subject of a forthcoming article on the unintended consequences of the 
DREAM movement. 
46. Caroline Black, Illegal Immigrant Carlos Montano Charged with Killing Nun in Drunk 
Driving Crash, CBS NEWS (Aug. 10 2010, 4:14 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-
20012650-504083 .htm!. 
47. [d. 
48. Id. 
49. Delia Goncalves, Illegal Immigrant Faces Deportation After Deadly DUI, WUSA (Aug. 2, 
2010) (quoting Paul Ebert), http://origin.wusa9.com!news/local!story.aspx?storyid= 106179&catid 
=188. 
50. The County passed legislation to deny public services to unauthorized immigrants, and 
diverted significant budgetary resources to immigration enforcement, needed because separate 
legislation had mandated that police officers check the immigration status for anyone arrested. 
AUDREY SINGER, JILL H. WILSON & BROOKE DERENZIS, BROOKINGS INST., IMMIGRANTS, POLITICS AND 
LOCAL RESPONSE IN SUBURBAN WASHINGTON 15-17 (Feb. 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edul/ 
medialFiles/rclreportsI200910225_immigration_singer/0225_immigration_singer. pdf; see also THOMAS 
GUTERBOCK, ET AL., UNIV. OF VA. AND POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, EVALUATION OF ILLEGAL 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICY, (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.pwcgov.org/docLibrary/ 
PDF/13188.pdf. 
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deportation. SI 
Although the "bad immigrant" narratives are created and broadcast most 
often by those with a conservative political agenda, progressive immigrant 
advocates inadvertently legitimize the very notion of simple immigrant 
narratives by countering them with "good immigrant" narratives. These 
countering stories emphasize how people come to support their families, 
work hard to raise their children, and support the U.S. economy by taking 
jobs no one else will take-and doing these jobs diligently. AdvocatesS2 also 
emphasize sympathetic causes politically-be it the DREAM Ace3 (for 
children who came to the U.S. as minors, graduated from U.S. high schools 
and have good moral character), the Refugee Protection Act of 201054 
(eliminating the one-year filing deadline for asylum seekers), the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Aces (providing civil and immigration remedies for those 
victimized by labor or sex trafficking)-because those stories remind Amer-
ica of the positive aspects of our immigration mythology. In the political 
climate in which these bills have been introduced, their appeal is clear, as 
even such "good immigrant" reforms face staggering barriers to passage.56 
However, there is an unintended cost to the advocacy that accompanies the 
"good immigrant" laws: By putting forward only blameless victims of 
others' acts (parents who brought children across the border, abusers, foreign 
persecutors, traffickers), advocates inadvertently set an exceptionally high 
bar for who merits membership in American society.s7 
Although this form of narrative is obviously more favorable to the 
immigrant-and to immigration reform-it, too, contributes to an over-
simplification of immigrants as people, and reinforces the "two box," or 
binary, approach, to the detriment of the vast and complicated middle. What 
51. The local Fox news affiliate did include three sentences concerning Martinelly-Montano's 
fiancee, two young children, and pursuit of immigration status, in a subsequent story. Will Thomas, 
Sisters Say Nun Killed By Drunk Driver Would Have Forgiven Him! Montano's Fiancee Speaks Out, 
MyFoxDC.CoM (Aug. 4, 2010, 6:08 A.M.) http://www.myfoxdc.com/dpp/news/virginia/fiancee-of-
man-charged- in-kill ing-va-nun-s peaks-out -080310. 
52. I include mysr.lf in this group, and apply the following critique to my own actions as well as 
the immigrant advocacy community more broadly. 
53. Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2011, H.R. 1842, 112th Congo 
(2011). 
54. Refugee Protection Act of 20 10, S. 3113, IIlth Congo (20 I 0). 
55. Trafficking Victims Protection Act, H.R. 2235, 112th Congo (20 II). 
56. See Shankar Vedantam, DREAM Act Defeat Reveals Failed Strategy, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 
2010, at A3 ("The irony of the DREAM Act's failure is that it had strong bipartisan support at the start 
of the administration, and advocates thought it could generate momentum for more policy changes. 
But as the country's mood shifted on illegal immigration, support among Republicans and some 
Democratic senators evaporated, with many decrying it as a backdoor amnesty for lawbreakers."). 
57. I plan to address this honest dilemma in a future article, examining the hidden costs and 
benefits of different approaches toward immigration reforms in a policy climate hostile to immi-
grants. This is another dimension of a problem already well stated by Leti Volpp. Volpp depicts 
dueling imagery of Chinese Americans, contrasting the good, "assimilated" Chinese Americans 
against those who were "ignorant and backward." The creation of the categories harmed those who, 
for whatever reason, could not conform to the "good" category created by the narratives. See Volpp, 
supra note 8, at 81. 
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of the idea that immigrants can be valuable, worthy members of society, who 
have sometimes considerable flaws-but whose flaws do not make them 
unworthy of membership in our society?58 The absence of complication and 
humanity from these dueling narratives of good and bad vastly complicates 
the task of seeking discretionary relief, as Peter and Veronica's experiences 
will amply illustrate. 
II. PETER, VERONICA, AND THE JUDGE IN THREE DIMENSIONS 
Returning to the two fictional immigrants in the article's opening vignette, 
we begin with the "bad immigrant" client, Peter.59 Peter saw his own father 
murdered in front of him one early dawn in 1989, when Peter was only eleven 
years old, and he never again saw his other family members, whom he 
suspects were killed in that same raid by Sudanese militia. He ran away, and 
became one of the "Lost Boys" of Sudan, the boys and young men who fled 
atrocious violence in southern Sudan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, who 
made their perilous way to Ethiopia and ultimately to a refugee camp in 
northern Kenya. The trauma endured by these boys is well known,60 and 
suffice it to say here that Peter's experience was not particularly unique-he 
witnessed atrocities by government authorities, saw loved ones and strangers 
alike die, felt helpless to protect them and grew up without even a parent 
figure, let alone actual parents. 
When the U.S. agreed to resettle hundreds of the Lost Boys in cities across 
America, Peter was granted his refugee visa. He approached the opportunity 
with awe and excitement, ready to begin life anew at age twenty-three. He 
arrived in Fargo, North Dakota in 2001, and received some orientation and 
job placement help from a local refugee resettlement agency. Because he 
already spoke English, he did not participate in ESL classes, but his accent 
was so different that people locally had a great deal of trouble understanding 
him. Nonetheless, within a few short weeks, Peter was enrolled in GED 
classes and had found a job working at McDonald's. He went to church 
regularly, and enjoyed bible study with the church members. He then found a 
58. It can be argued that America acquires a moral responsibility for its immigrants, and that we 
should look not only at what obligations immigrants have toward America, but what reciprocal 
obligations arise toward those immigrants. Bill Ong Hing, Providing a Second Chance, 39 CONN. L. 
REV. 1893 1897-99, 1901 (2007). Hing also describes the importance of belief in rehabilitation as part 
of a healthy civil society, and stresses that particularly for those who came as children and as 
refugees, America's failure to help them integrate becomes America's responsibility to afford them a 
second chance. [d. at 1894; see also Dori Cahn & Jay Stansell, From Refugee to Deportee, in RACE, 
CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY & LAW 237 (Kimberly Holt Barrett & William H. George eds., Sage 
Publications 2005). 
59. Peter's story was inspired by a prior client of mine, but I have altered almost every fact to 
protect the real client's identity. 
60. Because of the compelling heartbreak of their individual and collective experiences, articles, 
novels and films about the Lost Boys abound. See DAVE EGGERS, WHAT IS THE WHAT? (Vintage 2007); 
Sara Corbett, The Lost Boys of Sudan: The Long, Long, Long Road to Fargo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. I, 
2001, § 6, col. I (Magazine); LOST Boys OF SUDAN (PQV 2003), (nominated for two Emmys and 
winner of an Independent Spirit Award). 
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second job cleaning at a local elementary school at night. After about a year 
of this grueling two job schedule, breaking only for classes, study and a few 
hours of sleep each night, Peter started to lose his focus, and he began to 
drink and become more isolated. He knew nothing of support groups and 
therapy, and would most likely have resisted involvement with them even if 
he knew of them, since they were culturally foreign to him. The only tool 
Peter knew of for handling his troubles was alcohol, and his post-traumatic 
mental health symptoms (nightmares, flashbacks, hyperarousal) went unten-
ded. 
Pulled over one night in March 2003 for a suspected DUI, the sight of a 
police officer walking toward his car triggered Peter's flight instinct as 
Peter's mind reexperienced the moment when armed men killed his father. 61 
Panicked, he sped away, and when chased down, he spat and yelled at the 
officer. He has no memory of this, which is typical of a post-traumatic 
dissociation. Desperate to get out of jail, where he had been held because he 
could not post bond, Peter took the advice of his court-appointed defender 
and pled guilty to DUI and assault on a law enforcement officer, in exchange 
for dropping the assault with a deadly weapon charge. He spent six months in 
jail, and received an additional two years probation. He stopped drinking for 
a while, but returned to drinking in 2005 after his only close friend moved to 
California. Between 2005 and 2010, he had four "drunk and disorderly" 
arrests, none of which were ever prosecuted. A little over three months ago, 
he got into a fight with his roommate when both were drunk, and the friend 
pulled out a knife, prompting Peter to smash a beer bottle over his friend's 
head. When the police came, they arrested Peter, who was concerned 
primarily for his friend, and whether his friend needed hospitalization. Peter 
was convicted for a second time of assault with a dangerous weapon, and this 
time sentenced to three months in prison, with three years probation. Upon 
completion of jail time this second time, ICE agents transferred Peter to their 
custody, where they placed him in removal proceedings. 
The next character in the opening vignette is the "good immigrant," 
Veronica.62 Veronica is a thirty-two year old mother of two from El Salvador. 
When she was only seventeen, she came to the United States because she 
wanted to follow her then-boyfriend who had moved to Texas. She entered 
without inspection, and stayed with her boyfriend for a month, until that 
relationship ended. She then moved to Maryland to stay with another friend 
from home for a few months. She met Alex at a club. They began dating, and 
61. Such "reexperiencing" is a symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD follows 
exposure to a traumatic event, that evokes "intense fear, helplessness, or horror ... The characteristic 
symptoms resulting from the exposure to the extreme trauma include persistent reexperiencing of the 
traumatic event ... persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of 
general responsiveness ... and persistent symptoms of increased arousal." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC 
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 424 (4th ed, 2000). 
62. Veronica is a composite of numerous immigrant abuse survivors whom I have represented 
over the years. 
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after a few months together, Veronica became pregnant. Alex had been 
insulting and degrading before, but once she became pregnant, Alex's 
physical violence against her began. He pushed her into a wall and held her 
arms tightly enough to leave dark bruises. He hit her periodically during 
fights after their son was born, and then during Veronica's second pregnancy, 
he pushed her down their apartment stairs. Alex isolated Veronica and stole 
her earnings from the two jobs she worked doing part-time childcare. After 
their two children were born, he threatened to get custody of them if she ever 
left, because she was "illegal" and he was a U.S. citizen. During one fight 
with Alex, Veronica tried to fight back by throwing a candlestick at Alex's 
head. It grazed his shoulder. Alex called the police. The police who came 
spoke no Spanish, and they simply arrested Veronica based on Alex's 
account, and the small cut on his shoulder. Veronica received a deferred 
sentencing agreement, meaning that her guilty plea to the assault charge was 
withdrawn once she attended an anger management class. She stayed with 
Alex, but he provided no financial support. With no means of caring for her 
children, Veronica began to pay for her groceries with a stolen credit card 
belonging to someone for whom she used to work. These purchases were 
small enough that she avoided detection for several months. Continuing to 
feel overwhelmed financially, Veronica decided to use the stolen credit card 
to buy the supplies needed to start her own catalog cosmetics-sales business, 
at which point she was caught. Her former employer pressed charges and 
Veronica was convicted of theft, and served thirty days in prison, at which 
point the police brought her prior deportation order to ICE's attention. She 
was placed in removal proceedings, but Alex stopped her from attending her 
hearing, so she was ordered removed in absentia. 
During this time, she sought a protective order against Alex with help from 
advocates at a domestic violence service organization, who also encouraged 
her to file criminal charges. Alex was ultimately charged with four counts of 
assault, which he was able to successfully plead down to one assault charge, 
carrying a sentence of thirty days in prison. But during this time, Veronica 
was still struggling and got into a heated argument with her landlady over 
two months unpaid rent. Veronica grabbed a small statuette and hurled it at 
the wall behind the landlady, to scare her. The landlady called the police, who 
arrested Veronica and discovered her outstanding removal order. They 
arrested her for assault and attempted battery, called ICE, and kept her in jail, 
separating from her children who had to be placed in emergency foster care. 
The jail transferred Veronica to ICE custody last week, and she has her first 
master calendar hearing this morning. The lawyer who helped her with filing 
a protective order persuaded a well regarded immigration litigator to take 
Veronica's case pro bono.63 
63. It is useful at this point to consider how changing certain details of these stories would 
profoundly alter our views of Peter and Veronica. Peter is a black man, and his identity as such also 
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The third character, not routinely considered to be carrying her own story 
into the courtroom, is the judge. The judge had been a Peace Corps volunteer 
in Mali in the early 1980s, and spent one year after that experience working 
as a paralegal in an immigration-oriented non-profit in Washington, D.C. She 
decided to apply for a job as an Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) prosecutor in 1989 because she loved litigation, and believed that 
responsible, culturally competent prosecutors were critical to the functioning 
of the adversarial immigration system. She spent ten years as a prosecutor, 
routinely handling dozens of matters each week. She rarely had time to 
consider the individuals parading before her in immigration court, and she 
became increasingly frustrated that when immigrants got to their individual 
hearings, they rarely presented any corroboration of their stories, which were 
often riddled with flaws and implausibilities. Although she respected several 
of the attorneys who routinely appeared against her in immigration court, she 
held much of the immigration bar in contempt for exploiting their own 
clients, and providing poor quality representation. She began to feel affronted 
by the flaws in their cases, and had to remind herself (with a post-it note she 
stuck in her planner) that the government's interest is served not when it 
wins, but when justice is served.64 She increasingly believed, however, that 
justice was only served when she could pierce the veil of the fictions being 
woven by the immigrants sitting at the other table in the courtroom; she 
maintained that she was skeptical rather than cynical, and that her skepticism 
was vital to protecting the integrity of the immigration system and respecting 
the government's interests in removing immigrants. 
When she became a judge in 1999, she took a month off so she could 
refresh, and reflect on how different her role would be in the courtroom now. 
She was determined to playa different role, and not merely be a prosecutor 
with the judge's power. She hoped that the conscious weighing of both sides' 
evidence would restore her to a more balanced viewpoint. She quickly gained 
a reputation for being respectful to counsel and pro se parties alike, and 
hovered around the median in terms of her granting of asylum and cancella-
plays into the societal narrative about black men and criminality-and surely factored into the 
existence of his convictions in the first place. Had Peter been female, or white, would he have been 
arrested? Would the "complicating" facts of his trauma be more readily identified? And if Veronica 
were male, what chance would her story of abuse have? Would a male Veronica be seen as fabricating 
a story to mask over his own culpability for violence? These questions suggest that lawyers need to 
examine how immigrant narratives intersect with other narratives of oppression and subordination. 
See Jennifer Gordon and R.A. Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between Immigration 
and Race Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2493 (2007). This scholarship builds on the foundations 
laid by Kimberle Crenshaw and many others. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139. 
64. As Justice Sullivan wrote in 1935, "[t]he United States Attorney is the representative not of 
an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all, and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is 
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 
(1935). 
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tion of removal, among other forms of relief. Starting shortly after the 
September 11 ~ttacks, however, she began to feel an unspoken, but increasing 
fear about exercising her discretion favorably. She stopped issuing favorable 
discretionary rulings from the bench in any but the most clear-cut cases, and 
instead issued written opinions in those cases. She continued to issue 
negative discretionary rulings from the bench. Over the years, the number of 
favorable discretionary decisions has dwindled, and she is now at about the 
quarter-mark in terms of outcomes favorable to immigrants, although she 
still treats all parties before her with courtesy and respect. 
In 2010, about a year before Peter and Veronica appeared before her, one 
of her colleagues permitted one immigrant with a known history of alcohol 
abuse to be released on bond, over the objections of ICE, which asserted that 
he was a danger to the community. Two weeks after his release, the 
immigrant killed a child in a drunk-driving accident. The girl's death has 
haunted the judges at her court ever since. 
III. How THE NARRATIVES DEFINE THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Good Immigrants, Good Remedies; Bad Immigrants, Bad Remedies 
Applications for discretionary relief diverge along the lines of the "good 
immigrant" and "bad immigrant" stories that pervade American society, and 
adjudicators are not immune to those narratives (as will be discussed below). 
The same stories that capture attention in the political debates around 
immigration play out in equal force when we tum to immigration remedies. 
There is a set of victim narratives that comprise a "good immigrant" box of 
individuals, and a set of perpetrator narratives that comprise the "bad 
immigrant" box. These boxes correspond with the binary nature of relief 
available: remain lawfully or be deported.65 
Included among the remedies in the "good immigrant" box are the options 
available to those who have survived various crimes or forms of persecution. 
Domestic violence survivors can benefit from Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA) self-petitions,66 VAWA Cancellation,67 and potentially from asy-
lum. Those who have been trafficked for labor or commercial sex may be 
65. Juliet Stumpf addresses the acute limitations of these binary options, and calls for more 
graduated relief options. See Stumpf, supra note 15. 
66. INA § 204(a)(I)(A)(iii) (West 2002). VAWA self-petitions permit abuse survivors to file for 
immigration status for themselves, instead of relying on the abuser to file for them. For background 
on the creation of the self-petition and elements thereof, see generally Moira Fisher Praeda et aI., 
Preparing the VAWA Self-Petition and Applying for Residence, LEGAL MOMENTUM (2009), http:// 
i wp.legal momentum.org/immigration/va wa-self-peti tion -and-cancellation/articleslV A WA %20self-
petition%20SA %20MAN%20%200VW _9 .4.09.pdf. 
67. INA § 240A(b )(2). VAWA Cancellation grants permanent residence to certain abuse survivors 
who have been physically present for at least three years, who have maintained good moral character 
throughout that time, have no aggravated felony convictions, and who would experience extreme 
hardship to either themselves or a qualifying relative if deported. 
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eligible for T visas.68 Victims of many different kinds of serious crimes can 
apply for U visas,69 and those who have been persecuted, or who reasonabiy 
fear future persecution, may seek asylum.70 Regardless of complicating facts 
that may be present in individual cases, all of these remedies begin in the 
"good immigrant" box. By contrast, a number of other options for immigra-
tion relief begin in the "bad immigrant" box. Waivers for criminal grounds of 
inadmissibility, like the refugee waiver Peter is seeking,7l exemplify this. 
Peter's desired relief is not based on any harm he suffered, or any victim 
narrative he can tell, but rather on the thin reed of relief available as part of 
the law bringing the United States into compliance with the Refugee 
Convention, discussed below. 
Which box-"good immigrant" or "bad immigrant"-the individual starts 
in greatly affects the ultimate result. Sometimes, as in Veronica's case, the 
criminal inadmissibility (or deportability) ground may be easy to link to the 
underlying victimization, making discretionary relief accessible. Sometimes, 
as in Peter's refugee waiver, extraordinarily compelling personal factors may 
nonetheless be insufficient. The immigration box in which we start-here 
VAWA relief or the refugee waiver-powerfully determines how subsequent 
events play out. 
This article began by depicting Peter and Veronica in simple terms, which 
is how they will appear before a judge, at least initially. Peter is the criminal 
who abused the safe haven America offered him. Indeed, at his very first 
status hearing, when Peter attempted to explain to the judge why he was not a 
bad person, the judge cut across him firmly saying, "You listen to me sir. You 
were a guest in out country. It is a privilege to be here, and you abused that 
privilege.'m Peter's attorney knew that success in the case would require 
fundamentally shifting that narrative. By contrast, the first words the judge 
heard about Veronica's case were from her attorney, asking for the case to be 
taken off the detained docket, and letting the court know that as a victim of 
terrible crimes, Veronica was going to be applying for VA WA Cancellation 
and, in the alternative, a U visa. In the judge's mind, Veronica is a victim, and 
has likely evoked a positive response as a "perfect victim.'.?3 
68. INA § IOI(a)(l5)(T); 67 Fed. Reg. 4783-820 (Jan. 31, 2002). The T-visa provides a path to 
permanent residence for victims of an extreme form of human trafficking who have reasonably 
cooperated with law enforcement efforts to investigate or prosecute the trafficker(s). 
69. INA § IOI(a)(l5)(U); 72 Fed. Reg. 53014 (Sep. 17,2007). The U-visa provides a path to 
permanent residence for victims of certain serious crimes who have been certified by law enforcement 
as cooperating into the investigation or prosecution of those crimes. 
70. INA § 208. 
71. INA § 209(c). 
72. Although Peter is a fictional character, the judge in the real case that inspired Peter's story did 
make a comment virtually identical to this one. 
73. While the placement of Veronica in the context of "victimhood" is ultimately helpful to 
Veronica, the victim narrative is not without significant costs. See Goodmark, supra note 10; see also 
Carolyn Grose, Of Victims, Villains and Fairy Godmothers: Regnant Tales of Predatory Lending, 2 
NORTHEASTERN U. LJ. 97 (2010) (describing how "winning" narratives come at the cost of reifying 
simplistic victim-perpetrator narratives). 
228 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26:207 
Both Veronica and Peter need their criminal convictions to be waived if 
they are going to remain lawfully in the United States, on a path toward a 
more permanent immigration status. But the waivers available to them arise 
from different parts of the law, and position them-and their stories-very 
differently. Veronica is applying for Special Rule Cancellation of Removal 
("VAWA Cancellation"),74 available to "battered" immigrants, and she will 
also be able to apply for a U visa75 as a back-up option, because she was the 
victim of at least one serious crime (domestic violence, but also felonious 
assault, and perhaps even trafficking) who cooperated with law enforcement 
as they investigated and prosecuted the perpetrator, her boyfriend Alex. Both 
of these options emerge from VAWA, whose origins and mandate focus on 
protecting crime victims.76 Peter will seek a refugee waiver-a waiver 
created by Congress to comport with the United Nations Convention on the 
Status of Refugees' principle of non-refoulement, or non-return, of refu-
gees.77 The waiver permits refugees with all but the most serious criminal 
convictions to nonetheless be admitted to lawful permanent residence (or 
alternately read, permits the United States to refuse protection to the 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes).78 Even in their origins, then, the 
victim/perpetrator distinction is clear. 
1. "Good Immigrant" Victim Remedies 
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA"), and its subsequent 
iterations in 2000, 2005 and 2008, created and refined a number of immigra-
tion options for immigrants who had survived serious crimes-initially for 
domestic violence in particular, but expanded to a significantly larger set of 
crimes with the creation of the U visa.79 The language of "victim"-hood is 
74. See INA § 240A(b)(2). 
75. U visa petitioners must show that they were a victim of a particular crime that occurred in the 
United States, that they had information about that crime and suffered substantial significant or 
mental abuse from it, and that they were or are likely to be helpful to law enforcement in the 
investigation or prosecution of that crime. See INA § 101 (a)( 15)(U). 
76. Leslye Orloff & Janice Kagyutan, Offering a Helping Hand: Legal Protections for Battered 
Immigrant Women: A History of Legislative Responses, lOAM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'y & L. 95, 108 
(2001). 
77. See S. Rep. No. 96-256, at 4 (1979) (stating that "the new definition will bring United States 
law into conformity with our international treaty obligations under the [Refugee Convention] which 
is incorporated by reference into United States law through the protocol"). 
78. INA § 209(c); see also Office of the U. N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON 
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 
1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES" at 'II 156, U.N. Doc. HCRlIP/4IEngIREY.1 
(1992), available at http;lIwww.unhcr.org/pubIIPUBLl3d58eI3b4.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR Hand-
book] ("In applying this exclusion clause, it is also necessary to strike a balance between the nature of 
the offence presumed to have been committed by the applicant and the degree of persecution feared. 
If a person has well-founded fear of very severe persecution, e.g. persecution endangering his life or 
freedom, a crime must be very grave in order to exclude him."). 
79. See generally Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 
1902; Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA), Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
114 Stat. 1464; Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 
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prominent in the legislative history80 and subsequent regulations, training 
and outreach materials.8) By framing the objects of the law as victims, the 
law powerfully positions those granting relief under one of the VAWA 
immigration remedies as the victim's rescuers, a role that fact-finders are 
likely to find an appealing change to the often depressing march of cases that 
confront them daily. 
The law thus starts by defining Veronica as a victim. As we saw in Section 
I, however, she is also a perpetrator of at least one crime: she was convicted 
of credit card fraud and possibly committed assault and attempted battery. 
For both VAWA Cancellation and the U visa, she will need a waiver of her 
grounds of inadmissibility. VAWA Cancellation requires a showing of good 
moral character, but provides a waiver of this requirement where the 
convictions were connected to the abuse itself, something Veronica will be 
able to show.s2 She committed credit card fraud because of the economic 
abuse that was part of the overall abusiveness of her relationship-abuse that 
bordered on trafficking, as Alex confiscated her earnings. Her lawyer can also 
connect the assault to the enormous practical difficulties facing Veronica due 
to Alex's control over her finances, and her desperation to provide a roof over 
her children's heads. Her lawyer can tell a compelling story, part dutiful 
Cinderella in her rags, part Jean Valjean stealing bread for his family, to make 
her crimes seem almost laudable. 
She is likewise a ready candidate for a U visa waiver. The U visa statute 
provides that almost every conceivable ground of inadmissibility can be 
waived for a U visa applicant. s3 Veronica needs to apply for the waiver, 
which she may do at the same time she applies for the U visa, and needs to 
explain to her adjudicator at the Crime Victims Unit of USCIS's Vermont 
Service Center why granting such a waiver would be in the national interest. 
For U visa applicants, often the very fact of their eligibility (which entails 
(VAWA 2005), Pub. L. No. 109·162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006); William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 200S (TVPRA 200S), Pub. L. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (200S). 
SO. Legislative history concerning the passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act as part of 
the 2000 Violence Against Women Act shows the victim focus of both pieces of legislation. 146 Congo 
Rec. SIOI91 (Oct. 11,2000) (Conf. Rep., Statement of J. Managers) ("The enactment of the Violence 
Against Women Act in 1994 signaled the beginning of a national and historic commitment to the 
women and children in this country victimized by family violence and sexual assault. Today we 
renew that national commitment"). The statement goes on to mention victims 14 times. !d.; see also 
Orloff & Kagyutan, supra note 71, at 162-163. 
S1. A list of training materials authorized by the Department of Justice's Office of Violence 
Against Women (OVW) is available through the website of Legal Momentum. Breaking Barriers: A 
Complete Guide to Legal Rights and Resources for Battered Immigrants, LEGAL MOMENTUM, 
http://iwp.legalmomentum.org/reference/manuals/domestic-violence-family-violence (last visited Dec. 
27,2011). For a critique of the "victim" focus, see generally supra note 26. 
S2. INA § 240A(b)(2)(C). 
S3. INA § 212(d)(14) provides a broad waiver to those qualifying for U visas under INA 
§ 10 I (a)(15)(U), available for all grounds of inadmissibility under INA § 212(a) (with the exception 
of the inadmissibility ground for Nazis, participants in genocide or commission of torture or 
extra-judicial killing) if the "Secretary of Homeland Security considers it to be in the public or 
national interest to do so." INA § 212(d)(14). 
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cooperating with law enforcement) means a waiver may be in the national 
interest, so in practice the waiver requires a straightforward balancing test 
between the severity of the grounds of inadmissibility and the strength of the 
national or public interest claim (beyond law enforcement cooperation, such 
claims could include the individual's ties to the community, evidence of good 
moral character, hardships that would be faced ifthe waiver were denied, and 
so forth). For Veronica, even her criminal ground of inadmissibility-the 
credit card fraud conviction, which constitutes a "crime involving moral 
turpitude" (CIMT) in her jurisdiction84-has a sympathetic tint when seen in 
light of her need to care for her children, and to have an income to support 
herself, something the highly trained Crime Victims Unit85 understands, 
since they know the extent to which abusive relationships can impact an 
individual's economic circumstances. Her main negative discretionary issue, 
apart from the CIMT itself, which has triggered her charge of being 
inadmissible, is her assault offense. Even though she received a deferred 
sentencing agreement, which disappeared for criminal justice purposes upon 
completing the terms of the agreement, it still counts as a conviction for 
immigration purposes because she admitted facts sufficient to infer guilt-
meeting the definition of a "conviction" in the immigration code.86 This 
conviction does not constitute a ground of inadmissibility,87 but a judge may 
84. Fraud convictions generally constitute crimes involving moral turpitude, an ambiguous 
phrase that has been defined broadly in case law as conduct "which is so far contrary to the moral law, 
as interpreted by the general moral sense of the community, that the offender is brought to public 
disgrace, is no longer generally respected, or is deprived of social recognition by good living 
persons." Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 237 n.9 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Although these 
terms of "public disgrace" and "contrary to the moral law" seem to suggest only the most serious 
breaches of social trust, many CIMTs involve lesser offenses and focus simply on the question of 
scienter: Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008). Thus, knowing possession of 
stolen property, or knowing issuance of a bad check would both constitute CIMTs. See, e.g., Matter of 
Bart, 20 I. & N. Dec. 436 (1992) (knowing issuance of bad checks constituted a CIMT). The reach of 
ClMTs is broader than fraud, however, encompassing many state crimes of aggravated assault, failure 
to register as a sexual offender, burglary, drug trafficking, and so forth. See generally, MARY KRAMER, 
IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 204-16 (4th ed. 2009) (examining the character-
istics ofCIMTs); Morawetz, supra note 5, at 1941 (describing situations where minor infractions like 
using unauthorized cable service or turnstile jumping could constitute a CIMT that would render 
someone deportable). 
85. DHS provides statistics about the training of Crime Victims Unit officers in its report to 
Congress. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, REPORT ON 
THE OPERATIONS OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT UNIT AT THE USClS VERMONT SERVICE 
CENTER (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Resources/Resources%20for% 
20Congress/Congressional%20Reports/vawa-vermont-service-center.pdf; see also Symposium, Gen-
der and Migration, Empowering Survivors with Legal Status Challenges, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. 
& JUST. 304, 318 (2007) (remarks of Susan Bowyer). 
86. INA § 101(a)(48)(A). 
87. Veronica's assault conviction is not an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F) because 
there was no term of imprisonment (let alone for a year or more, as required by this provision). For 
argument's sake, in Veronica's jurisdiction, I assume that simple assault was also not a CIMT. 
Standards vary across the states, but in some jurisdictions, assault statutes that do not involve willful 
conduct or substantial bodily injury may not be found to be CIMTs. See Jean- Louis v. Att'y Gen., 582 
F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding a conviction under a Pennsylvania assault statute was not a CIMT 
because there was no scienter); Matter of Fualaau, 21 I. & N. Dec. 475 (BlA 1996) (holding that even 
reckless assault was not a ClMT absent serious bodily harm). 
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nonetheless consider it in determining whether she is someone worth a 
favorable exercise of discretion. With some skill by her attorney at contextu-
alizing the conviction within the overall abusive relationship, and perhaps 
providing a critique of the language-access issues surrounding her arrest,88 
the conviction is unlikely to outweigh the many positive discretionary 
factors, and she is likely to be granted the discretionary waiver. 
2. "Bad Immigrant" Criminal Remedies 
Peter's story is a perfect contrast to Veronica's. He came to the United 
States to avail himself of the protections the U.S. government offered under 
the Refugee Convention, and he benefited from the services extended to 
refugees for a period of eight months once he arrived. He is seeking a refugee 
waiver, specifically a waiver of criminal grounds of inadmissibility available 
through subsection 209( c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This 
subsection of the INA comes from the Refugee Act of 1980,89 which 
implements U.S. obligations under the United Nations Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees ("Refugee Convention,,)90 and the 1967 Protocol,91 
which broadened the Convention's coverage beyond merely World War 
II-era refugee populations. The framers of the Refugee Convention, and the 
legislators who drafted its implementing legislation in the United States, 
recognized the need to balance two sometimes-competing concerns: the 
state's interest in public safety and the refugee's right to safety from 
persecution. The Refugee Convention contains provisions that explicitly 
address such tensions, permitting states to refuse admission (or terminate 
admission) for those who constitute significant threats to public safety.92 The 
88. A 2002 study in one jurisdiction in California showed that in no case did officeI;S provide 
interpreters when domestic violence victims needed one. Women's Justice Center, Online Handbook: 
Advocating for Women in the Criminal Justice System in Cases of Rape, Domestic Violence and Child 
Abuse (last visited Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.justicewomen.comlhandbooklpartl_problem.html; see 
also Edna Erez & Carolyn Copps Hartley, Battered Immigrant Women and the Legal System: A 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, WESTERN CRIMINOLOGY REV. 4 (2) (2003), available at 
http://wcr.sonoma.edu/v4n2/manuscripts/erezhartley.pdf. 
89. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (19. 
90. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July 28, 1951, 19 
U.S.T.6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter "Refugee Convention"]. 
91. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. VII, 33, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6577 [hereinafter "Protocol"]. 
92. The Refugee Convention and subsequent Protocol (which broadened the Convention's 
coverage beyond merely World War II-era refugee populations) enshrined a duty of non-refoulement 
(or "non-return") in the law of international human rights. See Protocol, art. VII, 33. From the very 
beginning, this duty was tempered by acknowledgment that some individuals who might otherwise 
qualify for refugee status would be too dangerous for a state to be required to accept. In two 
analogous provisions, the Refugee Convention pairs the right of non-return with a limitation on that 
right. First, Article I creates the definition of a refugee, but in sub-section (F) excludes from the 
definition anyone who has committed a war crime or other serious non-political crime. Refugee 
Convention, supra note 85, at art. I. Second, Article 33 of the Convention contains the principle of 
non-refoulement itself in the first of its two clauses, and in the second clause permits a public safety 
and national security exception to the principle, applicable to those convicted of committing a 
"particularly serious crime." Id. at art. 33. Collectively known as the "exclusion clauses," the "serious 
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Refugee Act of 1980 mirrored those provisions, creating the 209(c) waiver 
from inadmissibility or removal for those-like Peter-who fled or would 
face persecution.93 
The creation of the refugee waiver through the Refugee Act of 1980 
reflects the notion that immigration authorities have the authority to show 
mercy toward refugees who have had criminal issues subsequent to their 
initial entry as refugees. Cases interpreting the waiver affirm its availabil-
ity-in theory-for those refugees with a variety of criminal convictions. 
The lead case on this subject is Matter of Jean,94 which considered the case 
of a refugee who had shaken a child to death, and was asking not to be 
returned to her native country, Haiti, because of the significant hardships she 
would face leaving the U.S. and back in Haiti. She initially won her waiver 
from the Board of Immigration Appeals in March 2001.95 The Attorney 
General then certified the case to himself the following year to overturn the 
granting ofthe waiver,96 holding that where an individual's criminal conduct 
was as serious as Ms. Jean's, a higher standard for granting the waiver would 
be imposed-namely, that the individual needed to show that there would be 
extraordinary circumstances or exceptional and extremely unusual hardship 
if the waiver was denied.97 
Jean, read carefully as applying to only the most serious cases,98 mirrors 
the interpretation urged by the Office of the United Nations High Commis-
non-political crimes" provision of Article l(F) and the national security exception of Article 33 are 
understood to be addressing the same concern of the Convention signatories, namely the right to 
exclude those who would abuse their refuge by posing a danger to the hosting country, and are 
interpreted together. 
The INA also contains a set of specific provisions for refugees and asylees who wish to become 
lawful permanent residents. This process, known as "adjustment of status," constitutes an entirely 
new admission to the U.S.-a legal fiction that an individual is being admitted even though that 
individual is most likely already physically present in the country. INA § 245(a). Thus, those refugees 
or asylees who had already met the standards for admission when they were originally granted their 
refugee or asyJee status must demonstrate anew that they are admissible. INA § 209(b)(5). It is that 
stage that individuals like Peter fail-or that our immigration system fails individuals like Peter. 
93. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. 
94. Matter of Jean, 231. & N. Dec. 373 (A.G. 2002). 
95. [d. 
96. [d. at 373-74. The events of September II, 2001, had happened in the interim, and were 
already beginning to powerfully reshape America's views of immigration. See Stumpf, supra note 35, 
at 285-86. 
97. Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 373. 
98. In subsequent cases, Jean has been read as precluding relief broadly for individuals whose 
records contain a violent or dangerous crime. Matter of K-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 661 (BIA 2004). More 
precisely read, it requires a showing of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship where the 
individual (not the crime) is dangerous and violent. Whether that was the correct threshold is beyond 
the scope of this article, but even accepting that threshold, arguendo, it is clear that the Jean holding 
requires courts not to define "dangerous and violent" using a plain language sense of what might 
constitute either of those terms, but rather to situate the analysis in comparison to Jean. See, e.g., 
Subah v. Attorney General, 256 F. App'x 556 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying a heightened standard to a 
conviction for the crime of corrupting a minor); Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying 
the heightened standard to a conviction for substantial battery with intent to cause substantial bodily 
harm by using a dangerous weapon, where the Respondent instigated a fight with a box-cutter and 
threatened to kill the victim); Togbah v. Ashcroft, 104 F. App'x. 788 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying the 
heightened standard to a conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery). 
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sioner for Refugees Handbook, which states that "the interpretation of these 
exclusion clauses must be restrictive.,,99 Explaining the nature of the balanc-
ing that must occur, the UNHCR Handbook states, "If a person has well-
founded fear of very severe persecution, e.g. persecution endangering his life 
or freedom, a crime must be very grave in order to exclude him."lOo The 
standard articulated in the Handbook actually comports with that articulated 
in Jean, reserving the possibility of refoulement in the face of such risks only. 
for the most egregious and dangerous criminal acts. 101 Furthermore, Jean 
permits discretionary relief even where the most egregious criminal acts have 
been committed, if the individual can demonstrate either extraordinary 
circumstances or "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.,,102 There-
fore, even under Jean, an individual may be able to show why despite the 
existence of serious criminal convictions, circumstances are such that his or 
her removal is not warranted because of the depth of hardship to be faced 
upon removal and because of our heightened obligations toward refugees. 
Nothing in this analysis suggests that Peter is ineligible for the refugee 
waiver. Although under international law, his assault conviction would likely 
not be considered the kind of severe crime that would constitute grounds for 
excluding a refugee, under cases subsequently interpreting Jean, his convic-
tions may be read by the judge, regardless, as requiring the higher stan-
dard. lo3 Nonetheless, that higher standard does not close the door for Peter, 
but rather moves him to the point where he needs to demonstrate either the 
extraordinary circumstances or "exceptional and extremely unusual hard-
ship" invoked by Jean. Clearly, Peter can do this. The horror of his life if 
removed to Sudan is easy to envision-Sudan is a country where he can show 
he faces persecution or death, where he has no family or connections, which 
was the site of horrific past trauma. Moreover, Peter's attorney can gather and 
introduce psychological evidence connecting Peter's criminal history to the 
trauma he endured throughout his adolescence, and has introduced evidence 
that Peter is an extremely strong candidate for treatment of his trauma-related 
mental disorders, and could show that Peter would have no access to the kind 
of mental health and alcoholism-recovery services in Sudan that could give 
him a better chance of recovering psychological health if he is granted the 
waiver. All of these considerations should amply meet the "extraordinary 
99. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 73, at'll 149. 
100. [d. at 'II 156. 
101. Jean, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 383-84. 
102. [d. at 383. The refugee in Jean was a woman who had been convicted of manslaughter after 
confessing to beating and shaking a 19-month-old baby to death. [d. at 374-75. The BIA in Jean 
originally granted the respondent's request for a waiver of inadmissibility, finding that even with such 
a serious criminal conviction, the respondent's positive equities warranted the grant of such 
discretionary relief. [d. at 378. The Attorney General overturned the BIA's decision, setting up Jean 
as a baseline case for where a higher standard of review was necessary, and holding that where the 
alien's criminal conduct is "as serious as" that of the applicant, the request for discretionary relief 
from removal will be denied except in extraordinary circumstances. [d. at 383-84. 
103. See discussion supra note 93. 
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circumstances ... or exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard 
set forth by Jean. 
But Peter has a final hurdle to clear, namely that the judge may still, as a 
matter of discretion, deny the relief even if he determines that there are 
extraordinary circumstances or exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. 
In Peter's case, this is what the immigration judge decided: "Whether or not 
Peter would face exceptional circumstances upon return to Sudan, Peter is a 
threat to public safety because of his criminal convictions. As a matter of 
discretion, his refugee waiver is therefore denied." 
And here we see with clarity how Peter's starting point determined his 
ending point. There is simply no way for Peter to win this case if the unique 
factor leading to the judge's discretionary denial of relief-Peter's criminal 
history-is the reason he needs the waiver in the first place. A decision like 
this creates an odd and impossible legal circularity, effectively taking the 
waiver away from those who would need it in the first place. The judge has 
the authority to show mercy to someone with a criminal history, because 
international law requires that public safety concerns be balanced by the 
nature of harm an individual would face upon removal. But by making this a 
discretionary exercise, she can simply sidestep those international obliga-
tions. Peter, the bad immigrant, has lost his case on discretion alone. 
B. Good Immigrants, Good Procedures; Bad Immigrants, Bad Procedures 
The polarized narratives of good and bad immigrants which show up in 
the immigration laws also frequently, but not constantly, intersect with 
sharply divergent procedures, which matter enormously to the crafting of 
cases that seek discretionary relief. Quality and fairness of the processes 
available to immigrants are clearly critical to how much an attorney can 
shape or reshape a narrative: Does the immigrant have access to an attorney? 
Does the attorney have access to her client? Does the client have access 
to support services? Does the adjudicator have adequate time to consider 
all the evidence being presented? Is the adjudicator trained in the some-
times subtle interactions between trauma and crime, or trauma and memory? 
Does the adjudicator's career trajectory encompass work on behalf of 
immigrants? 
For Peter, the answer to each of these questions is, no. Peter found an 
attorney through a law school clinic located four hours away and he can 
communicate with his student attorneys only with great difficulty. In deten-
tion, he has seen a psychiatrist only once, and he has been waitlisted for an 
alcohol-abuse treatment program. His student attorneys have been unable to 
find a psychological evaluator willing to help Peter pro bono or for reduced 
fees, because travel to and from detention would take eight hours or require 
an overnight stay. Peter's case is located in a gravely overwhelmed imrnigra-
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tion court system,l04 a system that has given him only two hours to hear his 
entire case, at which he will only be present by video. 105 The court system 
handles roughly forty percent more cases than it did a decade ago thanks to 
increased ICE enforcement activities, and judges are pressured to keep those 
cases moving as quickly as possible. 106 As one former immigration judge 
noted, "No one ever received any plaudits for slowing down the assembly 
line .... Whether it was intended or not, the agency's pressure was always in 
favor of speed.,,107 The pace and procedural difficulties of court make the 
task of Peter's judge exceptionally demanding, and compound the existing 
human tendency to find heuristics that will yield explanations and answers, 
as discussed in Section V below. 
Peter's judge, like most in the immigration judge corps, is a former INS 
and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) prosecutorl08 whose profes-
sional orientation, training and experience is largely focused on identifying 
credibility problems in applicants and their witnesses. DHS prosecutors 
inevitably have their own set of narratives to help make sense of the cases 
they see by the hundreds. 109 Although the government interest is in serving 
justice, 110 prosecutors exercise discretion conservatively, III and government 
immigration attorneys are increasingly reprimanded for zealously advocating 
in opposition to the immigrants, and not for "justice.,,112 As prosecutors 
become judges they carry those narratives and habits with them. The 
resulting problems deepen as judges experience "bum out." A recent study of 
immigration judges revealed exceptionally high levels of the phenomenon, 
which prevents judges from seeing the individuals before them as individu-
104. On average, immigration judges hear over 1,200 cases per year, and currently there is a 
backlog of approximately 268,000 cases. Sharon Cohen, Immigration Court: Troubled System, Long 
Waits, SEATfLE TIMES, Apr. 9, 2011, hUp:llseattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld!2014 
729244_apusimmigrationlimboi.html. . 
105. See Memorandum from Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 
Operating Policies and Procedure Memorandum No. 04-06: Hearings Conducted Through Telephone 
and Video Conference (2004), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoialocijloppm04/04-06.pdf). 
106. Cohen, supra note 99. 
107. Id. (quoting former Immigration Judge Bruce Einhorn). 
108. In 2010, after receiving sharp criticism for politicized hiring in the past, a strong majority 
(14 of 23) of new immigration judges were nonetheless former INSIDHS prosecutors. Three of the 
new immigration judges were formerly in private immigration practice, and four had experience 
working at a non-profit organization. Press Release, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't 
of Justice, The Executive Office For Immigration Review Welcomes 24 New Immigration Judges (Nov. 8, 20 I 0), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press!20 I O/lJlnvestitureBiographies II 0520 I O.pdf. 
109. This phenomenon will be addressed in Part IV in relation to judges, but the social 
psychology lessons apply with equal force to prosecutors. For a provocative examination of the 
problem of prosecutorial narratives, see PAUL GRUSSENDORF, My TRIALS: WHAT I LEARNED IN 
IMMIGRATION COURT (eBook 2011), available at http;llwww.amazon.com. 
110. See discussion supra note 59. 
III. See discussion supra note 43, and accompanying text. See also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, 
The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. LJ. 243,297 (2010). 
112. See, e.g., Samirah v. Holder, 627 F.3d 652,659 (7th Cir. 2010) (characterizing a government 
argument as "desperate"). 
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als, as opposed to simply more faces on one constant problem.113 Immigra-
tion judges acknowledge and lament these difficulties,114 which are an 
inevitable byproduct of the "extreme under-resourcing" of the system. 115 The 
thoughtful, measured analysis that might give Peter a chance is almost 
entirely unavailable in immigration court. 
Veronica's experience provides a sharp contrast to Peter's. Indeed, for 
Veronica, the answers to almost all of the process questions above are yes. 
She has obtained a lawyer pro bono largely because she did not face 
mandatory detention. Her lawyer has full access to her, and they meet 
regularly. Because she has been released from detention, she has been able to 
enroll in English classes to improve her job prospects, she has become a 
volunteer for many domestic violence awareness events, and she has re-
mained active in her church and her children's school. When Veronica 
prepares her immigration applications, her attorney is able to work with her 
to craft a sympathetic written narrative, to be filed by mail with the Crime 
Victims Unit in US CIS for the U visa, and later used in court for VAWA 
Cancellation. The written U visa filing, which requires no in-person inter-
view, is unimpeded by the limitations of direct examination, unhindered by 
the pressures of the judge's docket. She is able to assemble declarations from 
service providers and friends alike who will reiterate the victim narrative she 
chooses to tell. All of this will likewise be useful to the VAWA Cancellation 
application, and, thanks to not being detained, she can also more easily and 
cheaply obtain a psychological evaluation connecting her abuse to the crimes 
she committed, something which will add to the compelling evidence she 
will eventually present during her hearing. 
Although burdened with a high caseload, 116 the Crime Victims Unit does 
not operate under the same kind of time constraints as immigration judges. If 
an adjudicator in this unit needs another day to read a file, there is no external 
deadline-like a hearing date or mandated processing times-compelling 
them to reach their decision without the benefit of that extra day. Crime 
Victims Unit officers are highly trained in the dynamics of domestic violence 
and psychological coercion,1I7 so that they can, for the most part, readily 
113. Stuart L. Lustig et a!., Burnout and Stress Among United States Immigration Judges, 13 
BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 22 (2008). 
114. Id. at 28; see also Cohen, supra note 99. 
115. Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1651 
(20 I 0). Legomsky describes the situation vividly: "In fiscal year 2008, immigration judges completed 
278,939 removal proceedings, another 2, 102 miscellaneous proceedings, 13,294 motions to reopen 
and other motions, and 44,736 bond redetermination hearings. Approximately 214 immigration 
judges performed this work ... 
Those caseloads would strain the capacities of adjudicators under almost any circumstances, but 
the news gets worse. The support staffs of the immigration judges are exceptionally thin, a 
longstanding problem that has worsened with today's much larger caseloads." Id. at 1651-52 
(footnote omitted). 
116. As of June 2009, there were 52,956 applications pending. See USCIS REPORT, supra note 24, 
at 12. 
117. See Bowyer. supra note 80, at 316-18; see also USCIS REPORT, supra note 24, at 14. 
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understand why someone like Veronica might feel driven to stealing the 
credit card. And the entirety of the officer's portfolio consists of highly 
sympathetic cases. They must screen those cases for potential fraud, but 
especially in the U visa context where applications can only be submitted 
with a signed certification from a law enforcement agency, the adjudicator 
already has a good indicator of reliability. Denials of the U visa will therefore 
most often depend on legalities, 118 not on the inherent worth of the applicant. 
When someone like Veronica needs a waiver of criminal inadmissibility, that 
discretionary analysis only happens if the underlying petition is approvable, 
and therefore happens after an initial assessment of U visa eligibility occurs. 
The starting point for an assessment of Veronica is thus grounded in the more 
objective and, by its nature, sympathetic U visa decision itself, and the 
adjudicator has information about the abusive relationship to provide context 
for Veronica's criminal actions. A similar fact-finding progression occurs 
when the court first examines Veronica's eligibility for relief as a person who 
has, inter alia, "been battered or suffered extreme cruelty.,,119 Only after 
making this finding does the court turn to whether a waiver of criminal 
inadmissibility is deserved. 
IV. BARRIERS TO CHANGING THE COURSE OF A NARRATIVE 
Beyond the laws and procedures available to these two individuals, their 
initial narratives also carry vast power because of how difficult it is for 
adjudicators-as with most individuals-to change their unstated assump-
tions and choices about how they organize information. Admittedly, it is one 
thing to assert that adjudicators may be colored by the political discourse of 
the world they live in. It is quite another to assert that this coloration has a 
determinative effect on cases requiring judicial discretion. Yet there is 
significant research from the field of psychology demonstrating that narra-
tives are how human beings make sense of complex information, and that the 
human mind avails of these narratives sub-consciously in ways that matter 
profoundly for decision-making. Three insights from that research help 
illuminate why the dominance of over-simplified "good immigrant" and "bad 
118. Such questions would include: Was someone an indirect victim? How close with the harm to 
a bystander? Does the criminal statute that was prosecuted constitute a "similar criminal activity" to 
one enumerated in the U visa statute? The one legal element that does connect somewhat directly to 
the nebulous concept of "worth" is the "substantial physical or mental abuse" requirement. INA 
§ 101(a)(IS)(U)(i)(I). In determining this element, adjudicators are assessing the extent to which the 
applicant is a "victim," and how difficult the experience of being a crime victim really was for this 
individual. 
119. INA § 240(A)(b)(2)(A). This part of the Cancellation of Removal statute also requires the 
individual to have been physically present and maintained good moral character in the U.S. for three 
years preceding the application, and not be inadmissible under specific provisions of § 212(a)(2) or 
deportable under other provisions of § 237(a)(2) or § 237(a)(3). [d. at (b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv). VAWA 
Cancellation also requires that removal would cause extreme hardship to the applicant, or to the 
applicant's parent or child. INA § 240(A)(b)(2)(A)(v). 
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immigrant" narratives is problematic. 120 
A. Narratives as a Way to Organize Information Quickly 
In the crowded, harried world of immigration courts, with its attendant 
pressures on immigration judges, the ability of the human mind to organize 
information into narratives allows judges to move expeditiously through 
their dockets. 121 Gerald Lopez, one of the early legal scholars to incorporate 
narrative insights into law, framed this organizing power of a story: 
Human beings think about social interaction in story form. We see and 
understand the world through "stock stories." These stories help us 
interpret the everyday world with limited information and help us make 
choices about asserting our own needs and responding to other people. 
These stock stories embody our deepest human, social and political 
values. At the same time, they help us carry out the routine activities of 
life without constantly having to analyze or question what we are doing. 
When we face choices in life, stock stories help us understand and 
decide; they also may disguise and distort. 122 
B. Making Sense of Contradictory Ideas . .. by Filtering Out 
Psychologists studying the question of legal decision-making processes 
describe something similar. In the context of a similarly under-resourced 
court system, the magistrate courts in the United Kingdom, one psychologist 
explored how judges make decisions when they, like immigration judges, 
lack both time and critical information. Psychologist Mandeep K. Dhami 
~ested different theories about judicial decisions about bail in in these 
magistrate's courts, and found a divide between the quality of the judges' 
decisions and the judges' confidence in their own decisions. 123 Among his 
proposed explanations of judicial behavior, he noted that people, including 
judges, "may choose strategies that reduce cognitive effort." 124 Significantly, 
120. In doing so, this article extends to immigration law the scholarship from other practice areas 
that increasingly incorporate psychological research on narratives. See, e.g., Jerry Kang and Kristen 
Lane, Seeing Through Color Blindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010) 
(examining the subject in multiple areas of the law); Matthew 1. Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold: 
Confidentiality Laws and the Master Narrative of Child Welfare, 63 ME. L. REV. I (2010); L. Song 
Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, MINN. L. REV. 2035 (2011) (writing about 
criminal procedure). Many other areas of psychological research also appear in legal scholarship, in 
subjects ranging from identity politics to procedural justice, but are beyond the scope of this article. 
121. See Chris Guthrie et aI., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001) 
("[U]nder certain circumstances judges rely on heuristics that can lead to systematically erroneous 
judgments."), quoted in Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 417, 438 n.131 (2011). 
122. Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1,3 (\984) (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted). 
123. Mandeep K. Dhami, Psychological Rea/ity Meets Lega/ldealism, in LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 
9,49,67-68 (Belinda Brooks-Gordon & Michael Freeman, eds., 2006). 
124. Id. at 68. 
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he observed that the judges' ability to function well is hampered by "sub-
optimal conditions" such as the lack of procedural rules, unavailable informa-
tion and heavy caseloads, all of which likewise characterize immigration 
courtS. 125 Under these circumstances, decision-makers are likely to adopt 
"non-compensatory strategies," or "fast and frugal" decision-making pro-
cesses. 126 In the jury context, the narrative has been shown to be one such 
powerful decision-making heuristic. 127 This particular insight from psychol-
ogy makes intuitive sense to many lawyers who already know that trials are 
often won or lost based on the power of the story being told. 128 
When unique facts conflict with the stories our minds have assembled, we 
encounter the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance, a phenomenon consid-
ered one of the most important understandings offered by the field of social 
psychology. It illustrates the discomfort we experience when we are pre-
sented with two different ideas or opinions that are "psychologically inconsis-
tent" or where "the opposite of one [cognition] flows from the other.,,129 As 
described by one of the founding scholars on the subject, 
Because the occurrence of cognitive dissonance is unpleasant, people 
are motivated to reduce it; this is roughly analogous to the processes 
involved in the induction and reduction of such drives as hunger or 
thirst-except that, here, the driving force arises from cognitive discom-
fort rather than physiological needs. 130 
To reduce the dissonance, the individual can do a number of things. She 
could add more information that is consistent with the initial idea, so that it 
outweighs the more recent impression; these additional cognitions "help 
bridge the gap between the original cognitions.,,131 Alternatively, she could 
change the more recent information to make it consistent with the prior belief 
or idea. 132 The phenomenon matters in the interstitial world of discretion 
because it unconsciously leads fact-finders away from one perception of the 
facts presented in a case, to another that is more familiar. Again, Peter and 
Veronica's stories help illustrate the process. 
125. [d. 
126. [d., at 57, 68. 
127. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision-Making: Effects of Memory 
Structure on Judgment, 141. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 52 I (1988). 
128. Anthony Alfieri examines this power in the context of death penalty abolition, and writes 
that "story, in this way, is a medium through which 'a lawyer understands, makes sense of, and 
presents a case.'" Alfieri, supra note 10, at (citing MILNER S. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW: 
A THEOLOGICAL, HUMANISTIC VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS 23 (1981». 
129. ARONSON, supra note 28, at 178. For an insightful application of these principles to policing, 
see Andrew McClurg, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Cognitive Dissonance to Reduce Police Lying, 32 
v.c. DAVIS L. REV. 389,414-15 (1999). 
130. McClurg, supra note 124, at 424 (citing ARONSON, supra note 28, at 178). 
131. ARONSON, supra note 28, at 179. 
132. Id. at 178-79. The significance of the prior belief, and the weight given to it is explained by 
the first theorist of cognitive dissonance, Leon Festinger. 
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For Veronica's case, if it did ultimately result in an individual immigration 
court hearing, she already appeared as a domestic violence victim at the 
master calendar hearing, simply by naming her requested forms of relief. 133 
Now, later in the process, her lawyer has worked with Veronica on a sworn 
personal statement that places the different elements of her story within the 
stock narrative of a brave victim of domestic violence: a woman who 
suffered physical, psychological and economic abuse, who needed to provide 
for the two children she loved, and who took the necessary steps to do so. 
Thus, when the judge receives her application for VAWA Cancellation (or the 
Crime Victims Unit receives her U visa petition) and reads that statement, 
there will be no dissonance with the initial impression. Because of that initial 
impression, when her criminal convictions are considered, that arguably 
dissonant information must be resolved, and it is likely that the judge's mind 
is straining to reconcile the dissonant latter information with the prior 
impression. 134 Fortunately for the judge, Veronica's lawyer has raised the 
negatives of her criminal convictions as details in support of framing the 
story about Veronica's efforts to cm:e for her children, despite the abuse she 
had suffered. This provides the judge with an easy way to reconcile the latter 
information with the first impression. I35 Simply put, the judge has an 
expectation of a certain narrative, based upon other stories she is familiar 
with, and is unlikely to recast Veronica's story negatively to accommodate 
the dissonant information. 
How might Veronica be recast? Most negatively, she could be seen as a 
criminal perpetrator of fraud who destroyed the trust-and the bank ac-
count-of her former employer, simply because she failed to find a legitimate 
means of supporting her family, even after she had left her husband, and had 
the support and resources of a domestic violence service provider that could 
have encouraged her to find other ways to provide f0f her children. That is a 
harsh narrative, to be sure. Although a careful attorney will find ways in the 
narrative to inoculate her from having her story interpreted like this, 136 it is 
133. The motions filed by her attorney to secure her release and re-open her old case may also 
provide careful detail about the extent of the abuse Veronica suffered. 
\34. For a thorough discussion of how a judge's gender might also affect the processing of 
certain stories, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Asylum in a Different Voice? Judging Immigration 
Claims and Gender, in Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz and Phil Schrag, REFUGEE 
ROULETIE 202 (2009) [hereinafter REFUGEE ROULETIE) (applying Carol Gilligan's studies of gender 
and moral reasoning to the asylum context). 
135. Although not analyzed in terms of cognitive dissonance, Leigh Goodmark's scholarship on 
narratives in domestic violence law provides a critique of this artful lawyering. Goodmark lays out 
the characteristics of the typical story a judge in a domestic violence court expects to hear (the story 
of a passive, white straight woman), and she underscores the difficulties authentically told narratives 
encounter when they conflict with that pre-existing information in the judges' minds. By conforming 
to an expected narrative, the authenticity of the client's story is diminished or lost altogether. 
Goodmark, supra note 10. Carolyn Grose examines a similar loss of authenticity and dignity in the 
context of stories told about predatory lending "victims." Grose, supra note 68. 
136. This could be done by stressing how very precarious her financial situation was, how utterly 
traumatized Veronica was by her earlier failure to provide for her children, and so forth. 
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simply less likely-as a matter of human psychology-that Veronica will 
face that kind of withering disbelief after powerfully asserting herself as a 
victim initially. 
Domestic violence practitioners could fault this argument by noting that 
victims in domestic violence courts should, but clearly do not, benefit from 
such an initial psychological presumption. 137 Domestic violence courts are 
structurally analogous to victim-focused legal remedies in the immigration 
code: they are legal responses to a particular kind of "victim." Two differ-
ences between the settings perhaps explain the difference. First, the facts of 
the domestic violence are not litigated in the same adversarial manner in both 
contexts. In domestic violence court, the accused is usually present to defend 
his or her version of events. The abuser is not present in Immigration Court, 
and specific confidentiality provisions ensure he cannot find out about the 
proceeding from the government. 138 Although the ICE attorney may probe 
into the existence of abuse, it is more likely to be done as a credibility inquiry, 
and not for the purposes of presenting an undermining counter-narrative as to 
the abuse itself. The non-adversarial decision-making of the Crime Victims 
Unit, clearly, extends this difference even further (and the same VAWA 
confidentiality provisions exist here as in the court context). 
Second, skepticism fills the air of the domestic violence courts, from the 
initial filings with a clerk's office to the litigation itself, as women seeking 
protective orders are often disparaged by court personnel. \39 As yet, that 
same skepticism does not exist with those who assert domestic violence 
related relief in the immigration context; on a case-by-case basis, there may 
be inquiries into credibility, but abuse of VAWA has not emerged as a major 
concern of the government. Indeed the government increasingly prioritizes 
funding domestic violence organizations with holistic services because of a 
sense that immigrant domestic violence survivors are unlikely to avail 
themselves of the relief available under VAWA. 140 One reason for the 
different levels of skepticism may be that in specialized domestic violence 
courts, only one kind of "victim" story is told, which leads to jaded 
137. My own practice in the domestic violence courtrooms of D.C. Superior Court for two years 
led me to ask the question of whether the treatment of domestic violence clients undermines my 
premise. 
138. See 8 V.S.C § I 367(a)(I) (2006) (prohibiting "use by or disclosure to anyone (other than a 
sworn officer or employee of the Department, or bureau or agency thereof, for legitimate Department, 
bureau, or agency purposes) of any information which relates to an alien who is the beneficiary of an 
application for relieO; see also Memorandum from John Torres, Dir., Office of Det. and Removal 
Operations, on Interim Guidance Relating to Officer Procedure Following VAWA 200S (Jan. 22., 
2007), http://www.legalmomentum.org/assets/pdfs/icememo.pdf. 
139. See Njeri- Mathis Rutledge, Turning a Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence Cases, 39 
N.M. L. REV. 149, 160-61 (2009). 
140. "Holistic" services "go beyond a victim's need for a protection order and includes 
representation in other legal proceedings directly related to a client's experience of violence which 
are likely to increase the victim's safety and security," including immigration services. V.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN FISCAL YEAR 2011 LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR VICTIMS 
GRANT PROGRAM 7, available at www.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/lav.pdf. 
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adjudication, while the Crime Victims Unit hears various stories among 
many different kinds of criminal acts (with the U visa law alone extending 
protection to victims of more than twenty kinds of crimes). 141 
Turning to Peter, his case fits all too easily within the "bad immigrant" 
narrative that is readily available to the judge. He is someone who gained a 
great benefit through the refugee program, and squandered it through his 
criminality, abusing America's hospitality in the process. When Peter's 
attorneys introduce solid evidence of the many complicating and potentially 
sympathetic details of his life in Sudan, his transition to American culture, 
and his psychological fragility, those details compete with the original 
narrative, and through cognitive dissonance, the judge's mind will uncon-
sciously search for ways to reconcile those details with her original narrative, 
instead of changing the narrative itself. Cognitive dissonance is not determi-
native-the best adjudicators, whether explicitly aware of the phenomenon 
or not-strive to begin each case without reliance on narratives. It is, 
however, sufficiently common to be troublesome, particularly when paired 
with an overwhelmed system of adjudications that rewards speed and 
demands shortcuts. 
The problem as stated so far contemplates the dissonance that can emerge 
within a hearing on a single case: Within the story being told in this case, how 
do the facts comport with the judge's basic narratives that order her world? A 
subtler problem emerges when we consider that our judge handles many 
hundreds of cases each year, and thus must also face the dissonance that 
emerges across cases. Humans expend psychic energy making our beliefs 
and judgments consistent with our prior actions and beliefs. 142 The energy 
expended is all the greater when profound moral principles are at stake. As 
legal ethicist and philosopher David Luban has written, "[C]ognitive disso-
nance generates enormous psychic pressure to deny that our previous 
141. The fact that repetition of storylines fosters skepticism is well known; in the asylum context, 
adjudicators receive repeated stories with suspicion. See Siegel, supra note 33. 
142. Aronson describes the "painful degree of dissonance" that comes when you believe yourself 
to be a good person, but there is evidence that your job leads to people's deaths. ARONSON, supra note 
28 at 182 (discussing tobacco company executives and their responses to this dissonance). Aronson 
emphasizes a particular dissonance between actions that appear to go against a person's beliefs about 
themselves, or "self-concept"-a concept that "I am a person of integrity." [d. at 205. Dissonance is 
strongest "when (I) people feel personally responsible for their actions and (2) their actions have 
consequences." [d. at 207. "Aronson asserted that dissonance is strongest when it involves 'not just 
any two cognitions but, rather, a cognition about the self and a piece of our behavior that violates the 
self-concept.' The self-concept theory rests on the assumption that human beings have a high concept 
of self and strive to maintain consistency between that concept and their behavior. Of particular 
relevance here, this includes striving to preserve a morally good sense of self. If a person considers 
herself to be a moral person and commits an immoral act, she will experience dissonance." McClurg, 
supra note 124, at 424-25 (quoting Elliot Aronson, The Return of the Repressed: Dissonance Theory 
Makes a Comeback, 3 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 303, 305). Once a lie is told once, a cycle of justification 
ensues. [d. at 424-25 ("Whatever a person does, he will try to justify. The more difficult the initial 
decision, the greater will be the need to justify it. Once the justification cycle sets in after a difficult 
decision, it is very hard to reverse. Thus, once an officer starts lying, it is difficult to bring him back 
around to believing lying is wrong."). 
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obedience may have violated a fundamental [do no harm] moral prin-
ciple.,,143 Even if ajudge can transcend the dissonance created within a case, 
by hearing facts that do not mesh with a pre-existing, comfortable narrative, 
that judge also needs to justify any deviation in her perceptions with the 
many other similarly situated cases she has adjudicated before. 144 
Specifically, consider Peter again. His story is deeply complicated by, 
among others, his lengthy traumatic experience in Sudan, his childhood 
without parents, his inability to access mental health services either prior or 
subsequent to his criminal convictions, his unfamiliarity with the legal 
system, his inability to pay bond, his inability to tolerate jail (related to the 
trauma), and his lack of opportunity to redeem himself through volunteer 
work like Veronica's or alcohol-abuse treatment (because of mandatory 
detention). Imagine for a moment that Peter's attorney is able to introduce all 
this evidence. Our judge has personally adjudicated 134 refugee waiver 
cases, including roughly three dozen from Sudan. Peter's story is similar to 
all the other stories she has heard, although Peter's attorney is significantly 
better. If she grants Peter's waiver because the evidence has loosened the 
hold of her pre-existing, comfortable narrative, does that not mean she was 
wrong in some, if not many or all, of the previous decisions she made 
denying relief? The human brain, always desperately seeking ways to 
reconcile conflicting information and to create a coherent vision of self, 
particularly where profound moral decisions are at stake, may simply be 
unable to account for such divergence, and lead the judge to find some 
reason-any reason-to deny the case. Discretion, with its twilight world of 
unarticulated standards, is full of shadows where these reasons to deny may 
dwell. 
Likewise, for Veronica, the judge might, absent any prior impressions, be 
troubled by the nature of her fraud convictions, and wonder if they cast doubt 
on the genuineness of her applications for relief. If she had entered the 
courtroom without details of domestic violence already surrounding and 
coloring her case, this would be a fairly routine story for the judge: fraud in 
one area raises the possibility of fraud in another. Here, however, the judge is 
comparing her view of Veronica's case to other VA WA Cancellation cases she 
has previously adjudicated, where the grounds of deportability may have 
143. David Luban, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 249 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007). 
144. Luban builds his arguments from his analysis of the infamous Milgram experiments in 1963. 
Those experiments, which required volunteers to administer what they believed were increasingly 
powerful electric shocks on a fellow "volunteer" (who was actually part of the experiment team). The 
volunteers largely obeyed the instructions, despite their moral objections. Luban develops a proposal 
that their judgment had become corrupted: "by luring us into higher and higher level shocks, one 
micro-step at a time, the Milgram experiments gradually and subtly disarm out ability to distinguish 
right from wrong." [d. at 249. Luban then joins this insight with thoughts on cognitive dissonance, 
and finds that integrity is a question of dissonance reduction: "[W]hen, commenting that 'when my 
behavior makes me ... a great riddle to myself, I solve the riddle in the simplest way: if [ said it, / 
must believe it, at least a bit; if [did it, [must think it's right. '" [d. at 269 (emphasis in original). 
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differed, but the allegations of abuse and harm were entirely similar. If 
Veronica is making up her story, would it not be possible that many of those 
prior individuals were also making up their stories? Had the judge been 
overly gullible in granting relief? The power of cognitive dissonance across 
cases suggests that a possible dissonance with prior decisions will put a 
subtle but noticeable pressure on the judge to be internally consistent, a 
pressure which in this case works for Veronica. 
C. Believing What is Familiar: The Availability Heuristic 
Alongside cognitive dissonance, which drives us to ensure that later 
impressions do not falsify our initial impressions and judgments, we have the 
insight from social psychology known as the "availability heuristic.,,145 This 
, heuristic exists when people estimate the probability of an outcome based 
upon how many examples of that outcome they can identify.146 The more 
prevalent or familiar a story is, the more "available" it is, and the more likely 
an individual is to rely upon that story for making a particular prediction. 147 
The classic example offered by cognitive psychologist Amos Tversky and 
behavioral economist Daniel Kahneman is a study where participants were 
asked to say whether more words had 'k' and 'r' as their first letters or their 
third letters. Because participants could easily think of words beginning with 
'k' and 'r', but had more difficulty imagining words where 'k' or 'r' were the 
third letters, they favored the "first letter" option, despite the fact that words 
with 'k' or 'r' as the third letter are twice as common. 148 In the criminal 
setting, unrelenting media depictions of crime exacerbate a public informa-
tion deficit about crime prevalence---causing individuals to believe they are 
less safe even when crime rates are dropping, because that is the story they 
repeatedly hear, and it is therefore comfortable and known. 149 
As described earlier in the article, the narratives available to Peter's and 
Veronica's judge are narratives of good and bad, but seldom complex, 
immigrants. As such narratives repeat through the media, the availability 
heuristic suggests that they gain predictive power. By contrast, the absence of 
stories depicting the large middle ground between the two extremes makes 
such stories far less "available" to be recalled by judges. 
145. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207-232 (1973). This phenomenon has been applied within legal 
scholarship to study subjects as diverse as securities risk, see Tom C. w. Lin, A Behavioral 
Framework for Securities Risk, 34 SEAlTLE U. L. REV. 325 (201 I); health law, see Mark Kelman, 
Saving Lives, Saving from Death: Reflections on 'Over- Valuing' Identifiable Victims, II YALE 
J. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 51 (201 I); and criminal procedure, McClurg, supra note 124. 
146. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty; Heuristics and 
Biases,I85 SCl., 1124, 1127 (1973) 
147. [d. 
148. [d. 
149. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Mandatory Minimums and Popular Punitiveness, 2011 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. DE Novo 23, 25 (2011). 
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In Veronica's case, part of the judge's discretionary relief turns on 
Veronica's worthiness of membership in society (her likely future contribu-
tions and hardships as weighed against the bad facts that brought her to the 
judge's attention in the first place). The facts of the past are known to the 
judge, and the availability heuristic puts psychological pressure on the judge 
to predict that her future will match the good immigrant story the judge 
already knows: having already struggled to emerge from great difficulty, 
Veronica will be a hardworking, beloved member of the community hence 
forward. 
In Peter's case, the power of the availability heuristic provides the judge 
(whom David Luban would have us imagine as someone straining her 
psychic energy to find a reason why denying this case is the moral thing to 
do) with the perfect reason to deny the waiver: the judge can easily imagine 
Peter being released and committing more crimes because of the stock story 
of a "bad immigrant" who abuses the privileges America has provided. ISO 
The judge may consciously reject those narratives, but the availability 
heuristic occurs at a sub-conscious level, and she may not be able to 
recognize that the availability of the negative narrative powerfully sets up the 
perspective from which she looks at this individual before her in the court. 
Trusting in her own objectivity, she sees a man who has committed the same 
crime twice, been imprisoned for it twice, and who experienced no interven-
tion that would change his "predisposition" to commit the crime a third time. 
The availability heuristic makes it easy for the judge to deny Peter the 
refugee waiver-although she is sympathetic to Peter's story, the judge will 
be able to take psychic comfort in the fact that she is keeping a dangerous 
recidivist off the streets, and an unworthy immigrant out of America, because 
she can easily imagine that to be the case. 151 
In neither case is the law clear that one individual should win and the other 
lose. Discretion matters equally in both cases from a theoretical standpoint. 
Congress has delegated discretion for each, knowing that some negative 
factor exists which needs to be weighed against the rest of the individual's 
history and character. However, it is clear that the forces of dissonance and 
the availability heuristic can subconsciously set the judge along a path where 
the outcomes become increasingly clear, leading Veronica to success, and 
Peter to failure. It is clear that the law itself allows Peter to win, by creating a 
150. Peter's story surely also suffers from the availability of deeply rooted narratives about black 
men and crime-stock stories that have an element of inevitability to them. See discussion supra note 
58. 
151. Here we see how cognitive dissonance and the availability heuristic interact and mutually 
reinforce one another. Still troubled by last summer's drunk driving death by an immigrant with prior 
DUIs, the judge's initial impression or set of information is that immigrants in front of her who 
commit crimes repeatedly are recidivists who will harm the public. She will struggle to reconcile any 
information about Peter's rehabilitation prospects with that initial impression because it is dissonant. 
The power of that initial impression derives from its availability-this is a story oft-told, and well 
known to the judge through the media and matters closer to her own personal experience. 
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waiver specifically designed to address his criminal issues. It is also clear that 
Peter actually winning requires a long series of improbable events to occur. 
His woes are compounded by the series of barriers posed below. 
D. Other High Barriers to Reshaping Narratives 
Psychology is not destiny, and both judges and advocates can find ways to 
address the often unconscious problems created by the phenomena discussed 
above. However, the predictive power of stock stories, cognitive dissonance 
and the availability heuristic depends on how much opportunity the indi-
vidual, and perhaps the individual's attorney, has to counter the force of these 
mutually reinforcing effects. Here again, we see a divergence between Peter 
and Veronica. Veronica's attorney was able to introduce all the evidence that 
could help the judge make a favorable decision, including evidence her client 
was able to create (evidence of her rehabilitation and community service) 
while awaiting her case. Peter's attorney cannot because he is detained. 
Although this article contends that there are crucial psychological reasons 
why discretion is bedeviled, it is equally important to realize that even with 
the most self-aware of judges, it is doubtful that, for the vast majority of 
would-be applicants, this precondition of presenting the necessary good 
evidence could even be met. These reasons have already been amply 
explored in other work. This article addresses them briefly to illustrate how 
they amplify, for better and worse, the effects set forth above. In particular, 
focus has been placed on how each challenge is magnified for those 
immigrants who are detained. 
1. Securing Competent Representation 
Twenty-two of the twenty-four matters on our fictional judge's docket at 
the beginning of this story involved pro se litigants. The lack of representa-
tion in immigration removal proceedings has been well documented, as has 
its inverse relationship with the probability of gaining immigration relief. 152 
'Even securing representation may bring only limited advantages. The uneven 
quality of the immigration bar has been long noted as the level of skill and 
knowledge of immigration law varies significantly.153 Despite national 
efforts made to raise the quality of representation, increase competence, and 
152. REFUGEE ROULElTE, supra note 129, at 45 ("Represented asylum seekers were granted 
asylum at a rate of 45.6%, almost three times as high as the 16.3% grant rate for those without legal 
counsel."). 
153. One IJ bemoans the impact of poor quality representation in his courtroom, writing 
Many fine lawyers appear on behalf of the immigrants. But all too often the representation is 
mediocre. Some lawyers simply lack legal expertise. But there is also a kind of ennui that is 
widespread among lawyers who appear before me. Case theory is not developed. Necessary 
documents are not produced, nor are immigrants prepared to present reasonable explanations 
for why such documents are absent. Applicants and witnesses are often unprepared for the 
cross-examination by experienced DHS attorneys. 
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improve ethical standards,154 many immigrants will simply be ill-served by 
their attorneys, should they be able to find one in the first place. 155 
This problem is significantly worse for immigrants in detention. The cost 
of legal representation rises for immigrants in detention because of the 
logistical difficulties (including client communication, document prepara-
tion, and confusing and ever changing jail visitation procedures) and travel 
time required to visit detention facilities. For those who cannot afford 
representation, the situation is worsened by the fact that detention facilities 
are often located far from urban areas that might have robust networks of pro 
bono attorneys.156 Even in cities where there are large numbers of private 
immigration attorneys or attorneys willing to assist pro bono, detained cases 
are some of the most difficult to place, again because of the distances and 
bureaucratic complications involved in even the most basic client communi-
cations. 
2. The Challenges of Amassing Evidence 
Evidentiary burdens in immigration court require that the immigrant show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that she or he is entitled to the relief being 
requested. 157 The standard of what evidence is sufficient to meet that burden 
Noel Brennan, A View from the Immigration Bench, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 623,626 (2009). See also 
REFUGEE ROULEITE, supra note 129, at 45-46 ("Moreover the data do not take into account the quality 
of representation. Asylum seekers represented by Georgetown University' clinical program from 
January 2000 through August 2004 were granted asylum at a rate of 89% in immigration court. Other 
law school asylum clinics have had comparable success rates. Similarly, asylum applicants repre-
sented pro bono by large firms cooperating with Human Rights First ... had a success rate of about 
96% in the 479 cases they handled to conclusion in that same period."). 
154. A leading private immigration litigator deeply concerned with ethics in the immigration bar 
stated, "we are in the midst of an immigration ethics crisis." Michael Maggio, Making Ethics Really 
Matter, IMMIGR. LAW TODAY (AILA), Mar.lApr. 2005, at 30. 
155. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REVIEW, LIST OF CURRENTLY 
DISCIPLINED PRACTITIONERS, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/discipline.htm (updated January 2012). The 
Executive Office of Immigration Review maintains a list of disciplined attorneys, of whom 246 were 
suspended, 125 were expelled, and 60 were indefinitely suspended. 
156. See also DR. DORA SCHRIRO, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6-8 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/ 
pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf (describing how the locations with demand for detainee bedspace-
California, mid-Atlantic, Northeast-differ from the locations with available bedspace-Southwest, 
South). See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED Up FAR AWAY, § VII (Dec. 2, 2009), available 
at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/86760/sectionl8 (describing the phenomenon of ICE transfers of 
detainees to remote locations, and the incumbent strains placed on their attorneys, particularly pro 
bono attorneys). 
The profit-motivation behind these remote facilities has been well documented. See e.g., Laura 
Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law, NPR (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www. 
npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId = 130833741. 
157. 8 CFR § 1240.8 (d) (2012); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REVIEW, 
IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK: EVIDENCE GUIDE Part B(5), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ 
vlllbenchbookltoolslEvidence%20Guide.htm (last updated 2008) ("The respondent has the burden of 
establishing eligibility for any requested relief, benefit or privilege and that it should be granted in the 
exercise of discretion. If the evidence indicates that one or more of the grounds for mandatory denial 
of the application for relief may apply, the alien shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence that such grounds do not apply.") 
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has been clarified in the asylum context, 158 but no equivalent guidance exists 
for other forms of relief. In the absence of guidance, a prudent lawyer might 
conclude that the requirement to provide corroborating evidence where such 
evidence is "reasonably available" 159 pervades judges' expectations beyond 
just asylum cases. The litany of evidence that is desirable to include, simply 
on the discretionary portion of an application, extends from affidavits of 
family, friends, colleagues and faith or other community leaders, locally and 
in the country of origin, to documentation of educational accomplishments, 
involvement in community service projects, proof of activity in parent-
teacher associations or other child enrichment activities, abuse program 
support groups, charitable donations and activities. Any such evidence not 
originally written in English requires translation, which can be expensive in 
its own right. Although furnishing this kind of evidence might be a daunting 
project for anyone, it is a particularly difficult task for low-income immi-
grants, for whom time is a precious commodity, and for whom access to the 
internet and photocopiers is more expensive and cumbersome than those who 
have in-home or workplace access. 
The task does not end with this level of corroboration, however. To 
establish the complexity of an individual's story, motivations, and prospects 
for rehabilitation and integration (or re-integration) within their community, 
an expert psychological evaluation is almost compulsory. Yet, such evalua-
tions are costly, and networks of non-profits and social workers or psycholo-
gists who do these evaluations for free or at reduced rates are stretched thin. 
As with the challenge of securing representation, the costs of litigation and 
the shortage of expert witnesses intensify for those who are detained. The 
expert witnesses may need to charge more because of travel and wait times, 
may have insufficient time to conduct an evaluation inside the jail facility, or 
may simply be unwilling to take on detained cases, having already more than 
enough prospective clients who are not detained. 160 
3. Limitations of the Courtroom Itself 
A third set of challenges emerges from the courtroom setting itself, which 
is often described as a "traffic court" where death penalty cases are liti-
gated. 161 What this means is that a complicated cancellation of removal or 
158. See INA § 208(b)(l)(B). 
159. Matter of S-M-J-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 722, 726 (BIA 1997). The standard in S-M-J-
acknowledged that an applicant's own testimony, if credible, could suffice without any corroboration, 
but required corroboration where such evidence was "reasonably available." Id. In Cordon-Garcia v. 
INS, The 9th Circuit found no such corroboration requirement. Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 
992 (9th Cir. 2000). The REAL ID Act of 2005 imposed a nationwide standard on this question, 
codifying the earlier S-M-J- "where reasonably available" standard. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
109-13,119 Stat. 231, 203 (2005). 
160. See generally Deborah Freed, Assessment of Asylum Seekers, in RACE, CULTURE, PSYCHOL-
OGY & LAW 177 (Kimberly Holt Barrett and William H. George, eds., 2005). 
161. See Cohen, supra note 99 (quoting former IJ Bruce Einhorn). 
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refugee waiver case, like Veronica's or Peter's, respectively, may be allotted 
only two or three hours total, a time frame that may need to accommodate 
interpretation, as well. 162 Mindful of their dockets, judges may sometimes 
rush attorneys through certain portions of direct examinations, putting the 
attorneys in the difficult situation of balancing the risk of running out of time 
(a particular concern in detained cases, where any delay comes at great cost 
to the client) against the necessity of going into depth for certain portions of 
testimony. Equally bad is the frequent denial of an opportunity for an opening 
or closing statement, both of which may playa critical role in shaping how 
the judge processes information that is offered during the hearing.163 
For detainees, the lack of in-person hearings makes it even more difficult 
to effectively tell their story in a way that will counter the strength of the 
psychological forces described above. Because of the costs of transporting 
detainees to and from court, detainees almost always appear for their 
hearings via video-conferencing equipment, appearing in the courtroom on a 
monitor. 164 Although the right to an in-person hearing is regularly asserted by 
advocates,165 video-conferencing remains the norm. The technology limits 
the judge's ability to assess demeanor and the immigrant's ability to convey 
sincerity and build trust with the judge, and perhaps with the DRS prosecu-
162. Interpretation in immigration court is provided at the government's expense and is itself the 
subject of continuous reform efforts, in acknowledgment of its uneven quality. See, e.g., TRANSAC-
TIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC), Immigration Courts: Still a Troubled Institution, 
("Improved Interpreter Selection"), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/210/#M20 (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2012). 
163. MARIA BALDINI-POTERMIN, IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK §§ 8:17, 8:20 (2009). For a 
general examination of the importance of primacy and recency in trials, see H. Mitchell Caldwell et 
aI., Primacy, Recency, Ethos, and Pathos: Integrating Principles of Communication into the Direct 
Examination, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 423 (2001). 
164. This is permitted by 8 U.S.C. § I 229(b)(2)(a)(iii) (2012), and the accompanying regulations 
state that "[aln Immigration Judge may conduct hearings through video conference to the same extent 
as he or she may conduct hearings in person." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(c). 
165. The American Immigration Council (formerly the American Immigration Law Foundation 
(AILF)) has developed a template applying the due process analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge to the 
problem of video conferencing. The brief relies upon, inter alia, critiques of the efficacy of video 
conferencing where credibility is at issue. AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, Sample Motion to 
Request In-Person Merits Hearing, (July 2, 2008), http://www.ailf.org/lac/lac_liC080702.pdf. ("Stud-
ies on the use of video conferencing in courtrooms and other settings describe various ways in which 
a video testimony may erroneously portray a witness's credibility."); see also Kimere Jane Kimball, 
Note, A Right to Be Heard: Non-citzens' Due Process Right to In-Person Hearings to Justify Their 
Detentions Pursuant to Removal. 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 159, 184-89 (2009) (applying a Mathews v. 
Eldridge analysis to the question of in-person hearings for determining whether mandatory detention 
provisions apply. Mathews v. Eldridge balances three sometimes competing factors: (I) the individu-
al's private interest; (2) the fairness and reliability of the existing procedures and value of additional 
procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). 
Consider, too, the dilemma of filing a pre-trial motion on this issue. If, as is typical, the motion for 
an in-person hearing is denied, the immigrant must decide whether or not to appeal the denial to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Although the BIA will expedite decisions for those in 
detention, a decision could still require months-during which time the immigrant remains in jail. 
The cost of continued confinement balanced against the uncertain prospects of being permitted an 
in-person hearing tip heavily toward accepting the judge's denial (although the author can easily 
imagine certain clients nonetheless opting to pursue an appeal). 
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tor. 166 Because a powerful counter-story is needed to counter the forces of 
cognitive dissonance and the availability heuristic, the weakening of the 
immigrants' voice through video-conferencing technology has devastating 
consequences. 
V. CHANGING THE NARRATIVES 
This article began by claiming that there was much that united the 
experiences of Peter and Veronica, immigrants who both faced significant 
hardships and struggles to build their lives anew in the United States and both 
of whom incurred criminal convictions along the way. As woven through the 
article, however, the bifurcated narratives that prevail in America force the 
two characters apart, one toward relief, and the other toward removal. One 
goal of this article has been to name these problematic, subtle and powerful 
barriers that separate the Peters from the Veronicas, and affect the granting of 
relief that the law nominally provides. Another goal, however, is to begin a 
discussion of how these phenomena call upon lawyers to approach our legal 
work in new ways. The identification of these issues adds yet more weight to 
already compelling calls for structural changes to immigration adjudication 
and detention, something that judges themselves actively seek.167 But be-
yond structural reforms, these issues call upon advocates to start doing some 
things differently inside and outside the courtroom. 
The changes suggested below, from resource-allocation to legislative 
changes to lawyering practices will strike many as absurdly naIve. In a world 
where even the DREAM Act cannot pass Congress, these reforms are 
unrealistic right now, but they are nonetheless important aspects of a 
long-term vision of more merciful immigration law. A failure to name that 
normative vision implicitly accepts the parameters of the available discourse 
(here, the discourse of immigration reform efforts that start farther toward the 
anti-immigrant end of the political spectrum and away from a rights-based 
vision of a just immigration system). 
A. Structural Changes that Would Help Alter the Narratives 
The psychological phenomena described above all thrive in settings like 
Immigration Court where judgments are by necessity rushed or based on 
166. "[V]ideo conferencing may render it difficult for a fact-finder in adjudicative proceedings to 
make credibility determinations and to gauge demeanor." Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 322 (4th Cir. 
2002) (citingUnited States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 844-46 (4th Cir. 1995)). 
167. See, e.g., Bruce Einhorn, Consistency, Credibility and Culture in REFUGEE ROULETIE, supra 
note 129, at 187; Stuart Lustig et aI., Inside the Judge's Chambers: Narrative Responses from the 
National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 57 
(2008); Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I 
Immigration Court, 13 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 3 (Jan. 1,2008) (assuming the good faith and good 
intentions of the overwhelming majority of immigration judges who struggle to do justice in a 
desperately under-resourced system). 
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incomplete information. Some of the structural changes required to alter the 
way judges hear narratives then depend upon changing the character ofthose 
settings. Numerous elements of reform have roles to play here, many of 
which have already received considerable attention throughout immigration 
scholarship. Revisiting mandatory detention is one such area, either through 
litigation, procedural changes,168 or legislative reform that would eliminate 
or greatly reduce the categories for which detention is mandatory. Demore v. 
Kim determined that pre-hearing mandatory detention was constitutional,169 
and the decision relied in part on the fact that pre-trial detentions were shorter 
than the 180 days held presumptively unconstitutional in Zadvydas v. 
Davis. 170 Since Demore, cases interpreting INA section 236(c) are slowly-
and unevenly-chipping away at the constitutional bounds of that provi-
sion. 17l Further litigation could challenge and limit the reach of Demore v. 
Kim now that detained cases routinely lingered on dockets for a year or more. 
With fewer immigrants detained until the hearing and then forced to appear 
by video-conference for their hearings, this would directly enhance their 
ability to gather evidence of rehabilitation and present their cases more 
forcefully through in-person testimony. 
Changing the "traffic court" nature of immigration court through both 
increased resources and better targeted enforcement will also be helpful to 
reducing the predictive power of heuristics. Heuristics are most needed when 
decision-making happens in a rushed manner, and the overcrowded dockets 
of immigration courts create a setting where heuristics are most likely to be 
used. Suggestions for restructuring the courts include creating trial-level 
administrative law judges, with the appellate review done in an Article III 
Court,172 or the creation of an Article I Court with trial and appellate 
divisions. 173 Many of the most fervent calls for restructuring and increased 
resources come from the corps of immigration judges themselves. 174 
168. It would be easy to envision an immigration court equivalent to "deferred sentencing 
agreements" in the criminal context, where an immigrant seeking a refugee waiver, like Peter, would 
be released with the condition that he seek substance abuse recovery treatment and a certain amount 
of trauma therapy before his hearing; failure to comply with such conditions might trigger renewed 
detention. See Stumpf, supra note 15, at 1737-38 for other ideas of moving away from binary 
outcomes in the immigration court setting. 
169. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003). 
170. See id. at 528-29 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001» (contrasting the 
potentially "indefinite" period of detention considered in Zadvydas with length of pre-trial detention, 
which is often shorter than ninety days). 
171. See, e.g., Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing a lengthy 
period of detention from the 180 days found to be presumptively acceptable under Demore v. Kim); 
Geegbae v. Mcdonald, No. 10-10852-JLT, 2010 WL 4292734 at *2 (D. Mass. Nov. 1, 2010) 
(distinguishing Demore where detention had endured 19 months); Sidorov v. Sabol, No.1 :09-CV-
02314,2010 WL 1805690500415 (M.D. Pa. May 5,2010) (requiring a bond hearing after seventeen 
months of mandatory detention). 
172. See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE LJ. 
1635 (May 2010). 
173. Marks, supra note 162. 
174. Id.; see also Einhorn, supra note 162. 
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Additional remedies specific to this problem could focus on the availabil-
ity of psychological help for judges and immigrants alike, ranging from 
simply facilitating access of psychologists to detention facilities for treat-
ment and evaluation alike, to providing resources to address judicial burn-
out, to more ambitious efforts to reduce docket sizes by increasing funding 
for EOIR. Social psychology also offers us the oft-cited notion that the act of 
observing something, changes it. For the adjudicators themselves, then, we 
could envision awareness training on the effects of cognitive dissonance and 
the availability heuristic, to see if merely being aware of the phenomena 
helps adjudicators become more open to changing their view of an immigrant 
whose case is before them. 
These changes necessarily include greater access of immigrants to effec-
tive counsel-the need for sustained evidence gathering, careful case theory 
development, preparing character witnesses who can be enlisted to compel-
lingly tell the counter-narrative. Such efforts are ongoing, and are an 
important piece of the overall effort to remove the structural barriers that 
make the task of the Peters of this world so herculean. 
B. Making Space for Narrative Shifts 
1. Fighting for Narrative Space Inside the Courtroom 
Narrative shifts within the courtroom will come partly from addressing the 
psychological phenomena discussed in Section IV, infra. Doing this first 
requires that the attorney fully commits to and articulates her own belief that 
mercy has a place in America's immigration law today, and that a judge is not 
bestowing a favor by granting discretionary relief. Rather, discretionary 
relief contributes to a vision of immigrants as members of our civil society 
like all Americans l75 (the vision articulated by Bill Ong Hing) and future 
Americans (the complementary vision articulated by Hiroshi Motomura).176 
Such a commitment demands that we make ourselves aware of when we 
perceive our clients' stories in limited ways, just like the judges-these 
heuristics do not simply affect the fact-finders, although their effects on the 
attorneys is beyond the exploration of this article. l77 With that orientation, 
the attorney can identify the gap between her proposed narrative, and the 
judge's likely preconceived narrative, and choose to address that gap, and the 
175. See Hing, supra note 53, at 1893. 
176. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (Oxford Univ. Press 2006). 
177. One of the most powerful episodes in my clinical teaching thus far occurred when a student 
began the year at orientation wanting to deport what she thought was a hypothetical client, because 
his crimes offended her sense of how refugees should be above reproach, given the great benefit 
America has granted them in welcoming them here. When she was assigned to this actual client, she 
struggled, but within a semester had come to be his most powerful advocate. She then used her own 
journey to frame how to present the client to a judge whom she suspected shared her initial views, 
which is a critical piece of "shifting the narrative." 
2012] BEYOND SAINTS AND SINNERS 253 
cognitive dissonance it may generate. Since cognitive dissonance theory 
informs us that the judge will try to minimize the discomfort of the 
dissonance unconsciously, articulating the dissonance may keep the judge's 
mind open to alternate resolutions of the discomfort. 
Many attorneys already do this instinctually in opening or closing state-
ments, and can simply make some of those choices more directly responsive 
to psychological phenomena described above, first by naming the dominant 
preconceived narrative ("This sounds like a story we all know: the immigrant 
who abuses America's hospitality .... " or "From your questions, your 
honor, I know that you are troubled by how this case resonates with the 
stories we see splashed all over the papers of bad immigrants."), and then 
showing how this situation presents a different narrative that the judge can 
distinguish from the preconceived one or from previous cases ("Instead, we 
have heard the story of an enormously troubled young man, who did 
everything right except finding psychological help for his trauma, help that 
he was never aware of until he met the doctor who evaluated him for this 
court." or "But those stories fail to capture the innate good and worth of 
young men like Peter."). Nothing here is revolutionary, but it simply requires 
the attorney to give the judge psychological permission to see this case as sui 
generis by subtly calling to her attention the unhelpfulness of allowing those 
external narratives to enter the courtroom. In immigration court attorneys 
need to recognize that opening and closing statements are worth fighting for, 
since they are infrequently permitted. 178 
A second option is to take the client's narrative outside the confines of 
"good immigrants" and "bad immigrants" and contextualize it to American 
society overall, to summon familiar contexts that characterize the middle 
ground between good and bad. A young immigrant's two shoplifting convic-
tions last year at age seventeen may be less usefully told as "good immigrant 
makes a mistake" and more usefully framed as "teenagers: when will they 
stop making bad choices?" The judge surely knows someone who did 
something stupid as a teenager, and shifting the frame in this way allows her 
to avoid the "good immigrantlbad immigrant" dichotomy and opens the door 
to the more complex understandings society has developed about teenagers. 
Likewise, an immigrant whose domestic violence conviction involved alco-
hol may be able to position his story within the framework of Americans 
recovering from addiction, bringing in his sponsor to testify on his behalf. A 
critical benefit of these narrative shifts is that they can deploy the power of 
the availability heuristic in different ways. Instead of the young immigrant 
who is on a path to criminality, there is a widely available narrative that 
178. Again, tension exists between acceding to a judge's wishes and fighting for ways to allow a 
different narrative to be created in the courtroom; an attorney insisting upon making an opening or 
closing statement would need to heed that tension and craft the statements accordingly, aiming for 
brevity and power. 
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teenagers make mistakes and most of them grow up to be responsible adults. 
Instead of the story ofthe drunken abusive low-life, such a story may remind 
the judge of how effective Alcoholics Anonymous has been for thousands of 
Americans and see the possibility for lasting change. Thus, the attorney 
effectively begins creating a narrative space somewhere other than that of 
good and bad, a space that can be broadened over time by other clients and 
other narratives, step by painstaking step. 
Other strategies may be even more modest. Suppose, for example, that the 
judge dismisses a line of inquiry on direct into the circumstances leading up 
to Peter's criminal actions. Peter's attorney may wish to accede to the judge, 
hoping that by pleasing her and presenting enough information about 
prospects for rehabilitation, his criminal acts themselves do not need to be 
understood. However understandable the impulse, that choice keeps the 
complicated story of a criminal immigrant silent, which can be a missed 
opportunity. 179 Whether zealous advocacy requires the attorney to accede or 
to protest is not clear; pressures to please a judge are often at cross-purposes 
with true zealous advocacy. 180 However, even where an attorney decides that 
the balance of factors makes it preferable to accede, she can make an 
objection for the record, which will help if appeal is needed because she 
gambled incorrectly, and will permit her to briefly explain why that line of 
inquiry mattered. Because the availability heuristic underscores the impor-
tance of repetition, the more attorneys can do this, the more capable the judge 
will be to hear stories in new ways.181 
Many attorneys may feel ethically uncomfortable with doing anything 
other than getting their client as squarely in the center of the "good 
immigrant" box as possible. These ethical qualms are merited, but nonethe-
less require careful scrutiny. Our concurrent, and sometimes competing 
duties to represent our clients zealously, to consider the interests of third 
179. The attorney's ability to bring new stories into the courtroom is an important one. Muneer 
Ahmad has discussed the challenges of doing so, balancing ethical concerns with broader social 
justice considerations. Muneer I. Ahmad, The Ethics of Narrative, II AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'y & 
L. 117 (2002). Anthony Alfieri and Robin West have thoughtfully explored whether introducing 
certain kinds of stories rises from opportunity to moral responsibility. Alfieri, supra note 10; Robin 
West, Narrative, Responsibility and Death: A Comment on the Death Penalty Cases from the 1989 
Term, I MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 167 (1990). 
180. Note that here, the client him or herself may have a strong desire for this part of the story to 
be told to the judge, so client-centered representation may strike a balance toward confronting the 
judge's preferences somewhat more strongly than an approach that it is not client-centered. This idea 
borrows from Muneer Ahmad's compelling scholarship on individual narratives and broader social 
justice goals, although here, unlike the situation imagined in his article, the client's goals are in synch 
with social justice goals. See Ahmad, supra note 174. 
181. Again, Leigh Goodmark has already expertly applied this problem to the context of 
domestic violence courtrooms. "The failure to tell the stories of women who fight back not only 
denies the experiences of the individual women, but also undermines the credibility of the women 
who will come after them seeking assistance from the courts. Until judges grow accustomed to 
hearing the diversity of battered women's stories, they will continue to look askance at non-
conforming narratives." Goodmark, supra note 10, at 119. Goodmark goes on to explain how skilled 
advocates can address the challenges of non-conforming narratives but rues the fact that most women, 
as is true with most immigrants, go into court unrepresented, and unable to draw upon those skills. 1d. 
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parties, 182 and to engage in law reform 183 call upon attorneys to examine the 
systemic costs of putting certain narratives forward. At the least, if and when 
we ultimately do make certain choices to advance a client's interests, we are 
making those choices fully aware of their longer-term consequences, and 
perhaps bringing the client him or herself into the decision-making pro-
cess. 184 Furthermore, the costs to the particular client may be trivial, if any, 
when the attorney is able to put the best case forward for her client, but also 
choose words contextualizing the relief being sought, which recall why 
waivers exist at all, and how they are a tool the judge has to ensure that mercy 
keeps its place in our immigration law. Putting the judge back at the center of 
the story may help her shift her narratives from the immigrant's "bad"-ness to 
her own power to dispense justice. 
2. Creating Narrative Space Outside the Courtroom 
If part of the problem troubling the exercise of discretion is the limited 
nature of stories available to the judge outside the courtroom, then part of the 
solution is seizing or creating opportunities, both ambitious and modest, to 
tell different stories outside the courtroom. In a time when news outlets 
present many stories about immigrants, good or bad, there are almost 
unlimited opportunities to respond in ways that underscore the message that 
immigrants are more complicated than good or bad. Before the explosion of 
social media, these opportunities mostly included such activities as writing 
op-eds, letters to the editor in response to troubling depictions of immigrants, 
or testifying at local, state or federal hearings on issues related to immigrants 
and immigration. Such opportunities continue to exist. 
The wave of new media has brought with it, however, a rise in what is 
being termed "micro-activism,,185 that vastly expands the range of opportuni-
ties for putting forth different narratives, including such spaces as Twitter and 
Facebook. National immigrant-rights organizations like the Immigration 
Policy Center (IPC) and local organizations like CAS A de Maryland fre-
quently publish stories on Facebook and Twitter feeds, empowering their 
readers to share the information provided more broadly among their circle of 
182. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10 (1981) (,The duty of a lawyer to represent 
his client with zeal does not militate against his concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all 
persons involved in the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm."). 
183. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 6 (1983) ("As a member of a learned 
profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that 
knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education.") (emphasis added). 
184. See Ahmad, supra note 174, at 125. 
185. "Examples include the formation of political Facebook groups, re-tweeting of articles of 
political interest and sharing politically relevant videos on YouTube. These acts reflect micro-level 
intentions and are not necessarily geared towards mobilization like more traditional forms of digital 
activism." 1. Marichal, Political Facebook Groups: Micro-Activism and the Digital Front Stage 
(2010), http://microsites.oii.ox.ac.uklipp20l 0/system/files/IPP20 IO_Marichal_Paper.pdf; Xin 
Haiguang, Don't Underestimate the Power of Micro-Activism, GLOBAL TIMES, Feb. 11,2011, http: 
lIopinion.globaltimes.cn/commentaryI20 Il-02/621698.htmI: 
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friends and acquaintances, virtual and otherwise. 186 Many attorneys already 
do this work, often and well. To take advantage positively of the availability 
heuristic, more similar responses and stories are needed. Not only do such 
narrative shifts outside the courtroom have the potential to alter the outcomes 
of cases heard within the courtroom, they also ultimately have the potential to 
shape lawmakers' views of what is possible, which in turn may empower 
judges to incorporate more mercy into their exercises of discretion. Just as 
IIRIRA and cases like Jean sent notice to judges that the "bad immigrant" 
box was a large one, legal reforms could undo these messages. 
CONCLUSION 
America is deeply mired in another of the ages of immigration anxiety that 
periodically and predictably arise in our history. Lost in the politics of the 
moment is the effect that polarized debated is having on the thousands of 
individual immigration decisions being made that depend upon an adjudica-
tors' discretion. This article has attempted to connect the societal discourse 
on immigration to those cases, from a conviction that individuals are 
inappropriately shouldering the weight of those broader societal narratives. 
Discretion will continue to be a force in our immigration law, whether 
comprehensive immigration reform expands its role or not. As advocates 
correctly seek to expand the ability of judges to exercise discretion and 
fashion more appropriate remedies, we need to also see how the mere 
statutory availability of discretion fails to meaningfully expand an individual 
immigrant's ability to avail herself of that remedy-because judges labor 
under more than legal constraints. Judges enter immigration processes 
having internalized, to varying degrees, the society'S narratives about good 
and bad immigrants, and this article has attempted to explain why those 
narratives are so difficult to dislodge, drawing on the insights of the field of 
social psychology as well as the better known problems caused by access to 
justice issues within the field of immigration: pro se parties, detention, due 
process failures, and so forth. By shedding light on these phenomena, I hope 
to generate interest in changes tha~ would affect immigration processes on 
multiple levels, and move toward a vision of America as a country that 
welcomes not just the mythologized perfect immigrants, but real people, as 
worthy and flawed and full of potential as any of us. 
186. The IPC provides both news and analysis and, for example, ran a multi-part series providing 
state-by-state statistics on immigrants' contributions to the economy. For a first-hand view of the kind 
of information resources provided by the IPC, visit hup:llwww.facebook.comlimmigrationpolicy 
center. CASA de Maryland likewise shares national policy developments, but also highlights stories 
of local immigrants and local anti-immigrant initiatives. For CASA de Maryland's feed, visit 
hUp:llwww.facebook.comlCASAdeMaryland. 
